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. Introduction
Medicare coverage policy for new medical technology has been a very
controversial issue in the administration of the Medicare program since its
inception. The impact of advances in medical science and medical technology
on Medicare program costs has driven this controversy. This Article addresses
whether the Medicare coverage decision-making and appeal processes, which
are the Medicare program's "first responders" to new medical technology, are
adequate to meet the challenges of new medical technologies and their
associated costs.
. Background
This Part describes the Medicare program and its historical development.
In particular, it traces inflation in Medicare expenditures and health care costs,
and how that inflation was fueled in part by advances in new, expensive
medical technology. This Part then describes the Medicare coverage decision-
making and appeal processes.
A. The Medicare Program
Congress enacted Medicare, a federal health insurance program, in 1965'
and expanded Medicare coverage to the seriously disabled and to people with
End Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) in 1972.2 Nearly all elderly, some severely
1. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 102(a), 79 Stat. 286,291
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2000)).
2. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 301,86 Stat. 1329,1471
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (2000)).
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disabled, and people with ESRD are eligible for Medicare.3 In 2001, thirty-
eight million Americans (13.5% of the population) had health insurance
through Medicare.
The Social Security Amendments of 1965 established three distinct
programs: the Medicare Hospital Insurance Program (Part A),' the Medicare
Supplementary Medical Insurance Program (Part B),6 and the Medicaid
Program.7 Each program has different benefits, is financed and administered
independently, and pays for services according to different methodologies. A
mandatory Social Security payroll tax on all wage earners funds Part A,8 while
premiums of enrollees and congressional appropriations fund Part B.9 These
funds are invested in designated government trust funds for the exclusive use of
the Medicare program.'0
Medicare benefits include hospital and related benefits for acute illness
and injury, as well as physician and other outpatient services." Part A covers
hospital care and related home health and skilled nursing home care' 2 while
Part B covers physician and other outpatient services.13 Except as otherwise
specified, the major criterion for coverage of benefits is that they be "reasonable
and necessary for the diagnosis and treatment of illness or injury.' 4
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 established the Medicare+Choice
program (Part C) through which Medicare beneficiaries can enroll in HMOs
and other privately administered health plans.' Beneficiaries in
Medicare+Choice receive both Part A and Part B benefits and, at the option of
their health plan, additional benefits such as prescription drugs.' 6 Although
viewed as a major reform of the Medicare program with the intent of moving
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c, i-2, o (2000).
4. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE: 2001 (Sept. 2002), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/p60-220.pdf.
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395c-1395i (2000).
6. Id. §§ 1395j-1395w-4.
7. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 102, 79 Stat. 286, 343
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000)).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i (2000).
9. Id. § 1395t.
10. Id. §§ 1395i, 1395t.
11. Id. §§ 1395c-1395i, 1395j-1395w-4.
12. Id. §§ 1395c-1395i.v
13. Id. §§ 1395j-1395w-4.
14. Id. § 1395y(a)(1)(A).
15. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, §§ 4001-03, 111 Stat. 251,275-
31 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21 (2000)).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22.
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most beneficiaries to managed care plans, the Medicare+Choice program has
not attracted participation from as many plans or beneficiaries as anticipated.'
7
For Parts A and B, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) contracts with private organizations to administer the Medicare
program, including the implementation of Medicare coverage and payment
policy.' Further, Medicare contracts with health care institutions to serve
beneficiaries and often deems private accreditation of health care institutions as
compliance with requirements for participating in the Medicare program.'9 For
Part C, CMS contracts directly with the health plans and pays them from the
trust funds for Parts A and B based on the number of Medicare beneficiaries
enrolled.2 °
The advent of the Medicare program was a seminal event in the history of
American health care, representing the federal government's direct
responsibility for health insurance for the aged and seriously disabled.2'
17. See U. S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE MANAGED CARE PLANS: MANY
FACTORS CONTRIBUTE TO RECENT WITHDRAWALS; PLAN INTEREST CONTINUES 2 (1999) (noting
that "shortly before the start of the Medicare+Choice program, nearly 100 Medicare managed
care plans announced that they would not renew their Medicare contracts or that they would
reduce the geographic areas they served"), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/
he99091 .pdf; see generally Marsha Gold, Medicare+Choice: An Interim Report Card, HEALTH
AFF. July/Aug. 2001, at 120 (expanding on the idea that "[i]n contrast to the goal of expanded
choice, the [Medicare+Choice] program has reduced the range of choice that once existed... ").
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395h, i 395u (2000) (regarding fiscal intermediaries and carriers); id.
§ 1320c-1320c- 12 (regarding quality improvement organizations).
19. Id. § 1395bb; see Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Medicare and the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations: A Healthy Relationship? 57 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 15, 15 (Autumn 1994) (explaining that a health care organization meeting the
requirements of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, a private,
non-profit corporation, is deemed to meet the Medicare conditions of participation).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21(i)(!) (2000).
21. See KAREN DAVIS & CATHY SCHOEN, HEALTH AND THE WAR ON POVERTY 92 (1978)
("Medicare has helped protect the elderly and their children from the financial burden of large
medical bills."); JUDITH M. FEDER, MEDICARE: THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE I
(1 977) (reporting that initially Medicare provided health care insurance to the elderly in the
hope that the appeal of helping the elderly would overcome physician opposition to any federal
health insurance); SYLVIA LAW, BLUE CROSS-WHAT WENT WRONG? 31 (2d ed. 1976) (noting
that during the early 1960s it became apparent that private medical care programs were
inadequate and tracing the increasing congressional awareness of that fact); THEODORE R.
MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF MEDICARE xxiii (2d ed. 2000) (noting that the Medicare bill included
two related insurance programs to finance substantial portions of the hospital and physician
expenses incurred by Americans over the age of sixty-five); ROBERT J. MYERS, MEDICARE xi
(1970) (explaining that the enactment of Medicare provided extensive coverage against the costs
of medical care for persons aged sixty-five or over); HERMAN MILES SOMERS & ANNE RAMSAY
SOMERS, MEDICARE AND THE HOSPITALS: ISSUES AND PROSPECTS 1 (1967) (calling the 1965
enactment of Medicare "revolutionary" and noting its design to meet the needs of the elderly).
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Despite great need, health coverage for the elderly attracted formidable
opposition.2 The medical profession approached the concept cautiously out of
a fear of government control of medical practices.23 The hospital industry was
somewhat more receptive because the program would assure predictable
payment for hospital services in an unprecedented manner.24 Political
conservatives and most Republicans opposed the concept because they
fundamentally questioned the role of the federal government in providing
health insurance in the first place. 25 Indeed, passage of the Medicare program
was possible only because of the 1964 landslide victory of Democratic
President Lyndon B. Johnson.26
Medicare stands as a quintessential liberal victory in the tradition of
Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal.27 In 1960, Democratic President John F.
Kennedy picked up the mantle of health insurance for the elderly.28 President
Johnson, in the aftermath of Kennedy's assassination and with his consummate
legislative skills, shepherded the Medicare legislation through a Democratic
Congress.29 Medicare represented another step in the liberal dream of
comprehensive social security with the addition of national health insurance.
The program was conceived and informed by a liberal ideology of collective
action to assure the economic security of working people. The insurance and
taxation principles of collective risk-spreading under government supervision
and regulation form its foundation.
22. See Wilbur J. Cohen, Reflections on the Enactment of Medicare and Medicaid, 6
HEALTH CARE FIN. Rlv. 3, 4 (Supp. 1985) (noting that Medicare and Medicaid were highly
controversial issues attracting harsh criticism); Marian Gomick et al., Twenty Years of Medicare
and Medicaid: Covered Populations, Use of Benefits, and Program Expenditures, 6 HEALTH
CARE FIN. REV. 13, 14 (Supp. 1985) (asserting that in 1964 about three-fourths of adults under
the age of sixty-five had hospital insurance while only about half of adults over sixty-five had
hospital insurance).
23. See Cohen, supra note 22, at 4 (explaining that the American Medical Association
originally opposed early versions of even a limited Medicaid proposal).
24. See SOMERS & SOMERS, supra note 21, at 23 (reporting that the hospitals anticipated
"substantial advantages" from the Medicare legislation).
25. See MARMOR, supra note 21, at 23 (noting that Medicare bills had no chance of
congressional enactment during the Eisenhower administration).
26. See Cohen, supra note 22, at 5 (identifying Johnson's victory as a catalyst for rallying
support for the program).
27. See MARMOR, supra note 21, at 56-57 (noting that the most recent precedent to the
1964 social welfare bills was Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal Congresses).
28. See Cohen, supra note 22, at 5 (describing Kennedy's steps in support of establishing
a Medicare program).
29. See id. at 5-7 (outlining President Johnson's participation in the passage of
Medicare).
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The designers of the Medicare program were aware of the ideological
fissures surrounding its design and implementation. Indeed, the opening
section of the Social Security Amendments of 1965 states:
Nothing in this title shall be construed to authorize any Federal officer or
employee to exercise any supervision or control over the practice of
medicine or the manner in which medical services are provided .... or to
exercise any supervision or control over the administration or operation of
any such institution, agency, or person.
30
Further, the designers deliberately maintained the fee-for-service payment
methods for all providers, thereby seeding cost inflation, to ensure the
participation of reluctant providers. Congress suggested that reimbursement
methodologies of private insurance companies should guide the Medicare
program in the development of Medicare's reimbursement methodology.3' The
idea was to make Medicare look like Blue Cross Blue Shield service benefit
plans, the prevailing model of private health insurance at the time. Wilber
Cohen, then Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
observed that "[t]he ideological and political issues between 1960 and 1965
were so dominating that they precluded consideration of issues such as
reimbursement alternatives and efficiency options.
3 2
Nevertheless, the program continues to generate criticism from more
conservative elements on the political spectrum. Indeed, it has been the target
33of conservative ideological attacks, especially in recent years. Also, many
proposals for Medicare reform, such as the movement of Medicare beneficiaries
into private health plans, fit with more conservative visions of the program like
the Bush administration's Medicare reform proposal.34
30. 42 U.S.C. 1395 (2000); see also id. § 1396a(a)(23) (expressing similar guarantees for
the Medicaid program).
31. S. REP. NO. 89-404 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943,1976.
32. Cohen, supra note 22, at 5.
33. See, e.g., SUE A. BLEVINS, MEDICARE'S MIDLIFE CIUSIS 98 (2001) (asserting that
"Americans should not be forced into a single-payer government health care system-
Medicare-that limits their health care options and prevents them from spending money on the
treatments of their choice"); MEDICARE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: SEEKING FAIR AND
EFFICIENT REFORM (Robert B. Helms ed. 2001) (acknowledging the current political debate
surrounding calls for Medicare reform and presenting essays outlining proposals for change);
see generally DAVID G. SMITH, ENTITLEMENT POLITICS: MEDICARE AND MEDICAID, 1995-2001
(2002) (describing partisan attempts to shrink the size of government by targeting Medicare and
Medicaid).
34. Medicare Reform Act of 2001, S. 1135, 107th Cong. (Ist Sess. 2001); see also
NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF MEDICARE, BUILDING A BETrER
MEDICARE FOR TODAY AND TOMORROW, at http://medicare.commission.gov/medicare/bbmtt
31599.html (Mar. 1999) (proposing changes in the Medicare system).
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Immediately upon implementation, the Medicare program generated
enormous demand for health care services, and thus created sharp and continuing
increases in the cost of health care.35 Quite simply, the growth in Medicare
expenditures far exceeded preprogram estimates. 6 The need to address this
growth has dominated Medicare policy-making in all areas ever since.
Two major factors contributed to health care cost inflation. First, the
structure and financing of Medicare and private health insurance plans
contributed to excessive utilization of health care services.37 Specifically,
beneficiaries were insulated from the financial consequences of their decisions
to use health care services and provider payment methods were based on
incurred costs and charges which encouraged inefficiencies in care delivery.
Regarding the first factor, the federal government reformed Medicare
provider payment methods to facilitate control of Medicare expenditures. In
1983, Congress adopted a prospective payment system for hospitals, paying a
price per case based on patient diagnosis. 38 In 1989, Congress enacted a
revised payment system for physician services that paid physicians based on the
time and resources involved in treating specific conditions rather than on a
charge basis.39 By 2000, almost all providers were being paid a prospectively
40determined price for services.
Second, increases in costly medical technology contributed to cost
inflation.41 Soon after the inauguration of the Medicare program in 1965,
scholars and policymakers identified rapid development of new medical
35. See Gomick et al., supra note 22, at 35-45 (tracing the increase of use in services and
the corresponding increase in program expenditures by Medicare beneficiaries from 1967 to
1984).
36. See Proposed Medicare Reimbursement Formula: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 89th Cong. ii (1966) (noting that growth in Medicare expenditures
exceeded estimates).
37. See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Further Comment, 58 Am.
ECON. REV. 537, 538 (1968) (noting that "the seeking of more medical care with insurance is a
rational action on the part of the individuals if no further constraints are imposed"); see
generally THE ROLE OF HEALTH INSURANCE IN THE H EALTH SERVICES SECTOR (Richard N. Rosett
ed., 1976) (compiling essays concerning the market for health insurance, the effects of health
insurance on the market for health services, and national health insurance).
38. Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, § 601 (c)(1), 97 Stat. 65, 150
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww).
39. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 6102, 103 Stat.
2111, 2169 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(a) (2000)).
40. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, § 4603 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ffy)
(instituting prospective payment for home health agencies); § 4432 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1395yy) (instituting prospective payment for skilled nursing facilities).
41. Infra note 42 and accompanying text.
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technology as a factor in Medicare's cost inflation.42 No doubt Medicare
contributed to this escalation in new medical technology by infusing new
funding to pay for services to patients which included the new technology.
Indeed, in 1972, Congress expanded Medicare coverage to people with End
Stage Renal Disease to enable their access to the expensive new technology of
renal dialysis.43 Of note, Congress enacted the Medical Device Amendments of
1976 during this period to address the flood of new medical devices on the
market and to assure their "reasonable safety and effectiveness ... for human
use.""
In 1978, Congress created the first formal government technology
assessment function to analyze medical technology and its impact on federal
health care programs with the establishment of the National Center for Health
Care Technology within the Public Health Service.45 This federal technology
assessment function, although modified, has continued until the present.46
During the early 1980s, much interest evolved in the use of technology
assessment in determining coverage policy for public and private health
insurance programs.47 Private third party payors, also facing inflationary
42. See LouiSE B. RUSSELL, TECHNOLOGY IN HOSPITALS: MEDICAL ADVANCES AND THEIR
DIFFUSION 2 (1979) (describing that new technologies are a possible explanation for growth in
costs, but that third-party payors are the real culprit); see generally DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE, MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY: THE CULPRIT BEHIND HEALTH CARE COSTS?
(1977).
43. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 2991, 86 Stat. 1329,
1463-64 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 426(e)g) (2000)).
44. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 360c-k (2000)); see Bradley Merrill Thompson & Brian A. Dahl, The
Food and Drug Administration Review Process for Medical Devices, in GUIDE TO MEDICARE
COVERAGE DECISION-MAKING AND APPEALS 41 (Eleanor D. Kinney ed., 2002) (noting that
devices are reviewed to insure their safety and efficacy).
45. See Eleanor D. Kinney, National Coverage Policy under the Medicare Program:
Problems and Proposals for Change, 32 ST. Louis U.L.J. 869, 898-99 (1988) (describing the
creation of the National Center for Health Care Technology); Seymour Perry, The Brief Life of
the National Center for Health Care Technology, 307 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1095 (1982); see
generally Seymour Perry & Michael Eliastam, The National Center for Health Care
Technology, 245 JAMA 2510 (1981).
46. See Kinney, supra note 45, at 899 (explaining modifications in the federal technology
assessment function).
47. See John P. Bunker et al., Evaluation of Medical-Technology Strategies: Effects of
Coverage and Reimbursement, 306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 620, 621 (1982) (describing how
inadequate technology assessment resulted in the failure to develop a consistent reimbursement
policy); John P. Bunker et al., Evaluation of Medical Technology Strategies: Proposal for an
Institute for Health-Care Evaluation, 306 NEw ENG. J. MED. 687, 688 (1982) (outlining the
general structure for a proposed institute for health care evaluation which would perform
technology assessment); Stan N. Finkelstein, The Process of Evaluating Medical Technologies
for Third-party Coverage, I J. HEALTH CARE TECH. 89, 91 (1984) (reporting a study of the
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pressures, likewise gave greater attention to coverage policy in order to curtail
costs.
48
The debate over the impact of medical technology continues today. Mark
Pauley's article in this Symposium Issue analyzes these developments and their
implication for the Medicare program.49 Medical technology has had a
profound impact on the health care system and offers many new and effective
treatments.50 Further, the flow of new technological developments continues to
expand with enormous advances imminent.
5'
process by which coverage technology assessments are carried out by or for two large insurance
carriers); Barbara Greenberg & Robert A. Derzon, Determining Health Insurance Coverage of
Technology: Problems and Options, 19 MED. CARE 967, 967 (1981) (noting that in 1981,
Medicare was "reevaluating [its] coverage guidelines and considering curtailing reimbursement
for unproven, outmoded or marginal procedures"); John K. Iglehart, The Cost and Regulation of
Medical- Technology: Future Policy Decisions, 55 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 25,56 (1977)
(asserting that federal decision makers have begun to recognize links between the amount of
reimbursement and the amount of technology deemed as essential); O.B. Towery & Seymour
Perry, The Scientific Basis For Coverage Decisions By Third-Party Payers, 245 JAMA 59, 61
(1981) (discussing the progress of the National Center for Health Care Technology in
developing "an explicit, well-defined process for the medical and scientific evaluation of
medical tests and procedures to determine the appropriateness of their coverage under
Medicare").
48. See Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers' Assessment of Medical
Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1637, 1691-94 (1992) (calling for the insurance industry to
regulate health care costs by modifying general coverage policy to exclude less cost-effective
and less established treatments); Sara Rosenbaum et al., Who Should Determine When Health
Care Is Medically Necessary? 340 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 229, 230 (1999) (noting that "as the cost
of health insurance escalated, commercial insurers, Medicare, and Medicaid began to review the
medical necessity of physicians' treatment recommendations as the basis for determining which
procedures and services would be covered"); Claudia A. Steiner et al., Technology Coverage
Decisions by Health Care Plans and Considerations by Medical Directors, 35 MED. CARE 472,
484 (1997) (describing that with regard to private insurance plans, "economic considerations,
particularly cost-effectiveness, are now important criteria for coverage").
49. Mark V. Pauly, What if Technology Never Stops Improving? Medicare's Future
Under Continuous Cost Increases, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1233 (2003).
50. See generally Claude H. Organ, Jr., The Impact of Technology on Surgery, 134
ARCHIVES OF SURGERY 1175 (1999) (describing technological advances and their impact on
surgery); John M. Eisenberg & Elaine J. Power, Transforming Insurance Coverage into Quality
Health Care: Voltage Drops from Potential to Delivered Quality, 284 JAMA 2100, 2100
(2000) ("The stream of innovations that reach the US health care system holds enormous
potential to improve the quality of care.").
51. See Einer Elhauge, The Limited Regulatory Potential Of Medical Technology
Assessment, 82 VA. L. REv. 1525, 1526 (1996) (noting that if incentive is provided to encourage
the provision of all medical care having positive net health benefits regardless of cost, then
innovations which provide only marginal health benefits at a great cost will flourish); Lars
Noah, Medicine's Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the
Biomedical Community, 44 ARuz. L. REv. 373,404-05 (2002) (asserting that rapid progress and
the pace of knowledge production and acquisition in both biomedical research and medicine in
general make it difficult for physicians to keep up with all of the changes); see also
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But technology also raises several important additional issues-some of
which are profoundly philosophical. First, and of interest to the medical
community, policy makers, and third party payors, is a new technology really
effective in treating illness and injury in ways that justify its costs? Second,
does new technology add more to the care process and substitute for older, less
effective technologies? Important evidence suggests that when new
technologies come on line, they do not necessarily replace older technologies,
thereby increasing the overall cost of care. 52 Third, under what circumstances
should third party payors cover new technologies, particularly when they are
expensive and do not add appreciable value to care in terms of patient
outcomes? This last issue has been an especially contentious one with respect
to new cancer treatments.
53
Further, the process by which third party payors make decisions about
coverage is important. All third party payors invoke some process, albeit
unconsciously. 4 Notably, many private payors have been sued over adverse
coverage decisions regarding new medical technologies and have been ordered
by courts to pay for the technology in specific cases.5 Also note that Medicare
Biotechnology Industry Organization, Biotechnology's Impact on Diseases of the Elderly: A
White Paper, at www.bio.org/news/whitepaper.htm (Sept. 2000) (examining biotech
medicines on the market and in development and detailing their impact on patients); William B.
Schwartz, In the Pipeline: A Wave of Valuable Medical Technology, HEALTH AFF., Summer
1994, at 70, 79 (describing a few of the technological advances expected to come about in the
next twenty-five to thirty years).
52. See John M. Eisenberg et al., Substituting Diagnostic Services: New Tests Only
Partly Replace Older Ones, 262 JAMA 1196,1200 (1989) (presenting test results which show
that the adoption of new technology is only sometimes associated with abandonment of the
corresponding older services, possibly increasing the cost of medical care).
53. See William P. Peters & Mark C. Rogers, Variation in Approval by Insurance
Companies of Coveragefor Autologous Bone Marrow Transplantation For Breast Cancer, 330
NEw ENG. J. MED. 473, 474-75 (1994) (studying trends in coverage approval or denial by third-
party payors for patients participating in clinical studies of new cancer treatments); Henry M.
Williams, Cancer Therapy: Reimbursement of New Therapeutic Technologies, 65 YALE J.
BIOLOGY MED. 83, 94 (1992) (addressing the problems associated with reimbursement for new
technologies and proposing a model coverage decision process); see also George Anders,
Researchers Call Insurers 'Arbitrary' in Covering Bone-Marrow Transplants, WALL ST. J., Feb.
17, 1994, at B12 (summarizing the 1994 study by William P. Peters and Mark C. Rogers).
54. See ELEANOR D. KINNEY, PROTECTING AMERICAN HEALTH CARE CONSUMERS 109-13
(2002) (describing "processes for making policies pertaining to the content and quality of health
care").
55. See, e.g., Mark A. Hall et al., Judicial Protection of Managed Care Consumers: An
Empirical Study ofInsurance Coverage Disputes, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1055, 1056 (1996)
("Analyz[ing] judicial determinations of health insurance coverage disputes from an empirical
perspective, using a method called 'content analysis.'"); Richard Saver, Reimbursing New
Technologies. Why Are the Courts Judging Experimental Medicine?, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1095,
1098-1104 (1992) (examining case law arising from denials of coverage); see also Gerard F.
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coverage decision-making influences decisions for public health insurance
programs.5 6
Finally, the controversy over the Medicare coverage decision-making and
appeal procedures (or coverage issues of private insurers, for that matter) is not
likely to diffuse in the future given trends in the growth in health care
expenditures and also the growth in the proportion of the population over 65.
Table I illustrates these important trends.
Table 1: National Health Expenditures and Selected Economic
Indicators, Years 1980-2010 (Modified CMS Table)"
Item 1980 1990 2000 2010
National Health Expenditures $245.8 $696.0 $1,299.5 $2,639.2
(billions)
National Health Expenditures as a 8.8 12.0 13.2 16.8
Percent of Gross Domestic Product
National Health Expenditures Per $1,067 $2,738 $4,637 $8,704
Capita III _I
Population Age 65 Years and Older 25.8 31.5 35.1 39.0
B. The Medicare Coverage Decision-Making and Appeals Processes
From 1965 to the present, due to the pressure for coverage of new medical
procedures, devices, and other technologies, the Medicare coverage decision-
making process moved from an informal, primarily local process, in which
Anderson et al., Medical Technology Assessment and Practice Guidelines: TheirDayin Court,
83 AM. J. Pun. HEALTH 1635, 1635 (1993) (noting that "[p]ast efforts by public and private
insurers to deny claims on the basis of the results of formal technology assessments or practice
guidelines have frequently been overturned by the courts"); John H. Ferguson et al., Court-
Ordered Reimbursement for Unproven Medical Technology: Circumventing Technology
Assessment, 269 JAMA 2116, 2118-20 (1993) (providing studies of cases in which the court
has ordered reimbursement for emerging medical technologies).
56. See KINNEY, supra note 54, at 110 ("[G]ovemment agencies rely extensively on
standards made by private organizations for public regulatory programs.").
57. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, NATIONAL
HEALTH EXPENDITURES AND SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS, LEVELS AND AVERAGE ANNUAL
PERCENT CHANGE: SELECTED CALENDAR YEARS 1980-2011, at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/statistic
s/nhe/projections-2001/t 1.asp (last visited May 19, 2003).
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Medicare carriers and other Medicare contractors made coverage decisions
locally, to a more formal, more centralized process for making national
coverage determinations (NCDs). CMS publishes national coverage policy in
program manuals.58 Medicare contractors make and publicize local coverage
decisions.
The transformation in this process occurred because of pressure from an
increased rate of advances in new medical technology and a call for coverage of
these new technologies. For example, with highly visible life-saving
technologies such as organ transplantation, nationwide consistency in coverage
decisions became more important. For example, in the early 1980s, heart
transplants were covered only in California, which caused some concerns about
the fairness of the treatment of similarly situated Medicare beneficiaries in
different regions.59
In the early 1980s, the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), the
predecessor agency to CMS, developed an internal process for making national
coverage decisions. 6° Specifically, HCFA convened an informal committee of
physicians who worked for HCFA.6' The committee was not established by
statute or regulation and met privately with no published agenda or opportunity
for participation by interested parties or members of the public. 62 The HCFA
office in charge of coverage policy conducted reviews of the relevant medical
literature and consulted with medical specialty societies and other physicians'
organizations. For more complex or controversial coverage issues, the HCFA
coverage policy-making office would request a technology assessment from the
Public Health Service (PHS).63
The informality and the secrecy of the Medicare coverage decision-making
process generated much criticism in the 1980s, as coverage decision-making
became more frequent and gained the attention of the constituencies of the
58. HEALTH CARE FiN. ADMIN., CARRIERS MANUAL (1998); HEALTH CARE FIN. ADMIN.,
COVERAGE ISSUES MANUAL (1998) in MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 27,201 (1998);
see generally Timothy S. Jost, Governing Medicare, 51 ADMIN. L. REv. 39(1998) (providing a
brief outline of the administration of Medicare); Kinney, supra note 45, at 879-83 (outlining the
procedures for making national coverage policy).
59. See Richard A. Knox, Heart Transplants: To Pay or Not to Pay, 209 SCIENCE 570,
575 (1980) (noting that when confronted with a dying patient, resource allocation arguments
tend to appear bureaucratic).
60. See Kinney, supra note 45, at 879-83 (describing the national coverage decision
process).
61. See id. at 880 (noting that the HCFA Physicians Panel was formed in 1980).
62. See id. (stating that the panel meets "in private and without a published agenda").
63. Id. at 881.
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Medicare program.64 For example, the Administrative Conference of the
United States, the U.S. General Accounting Office, and also the American Bar
Association expressed concems about the closed character of HCFA's coverage
decision-making process and suggested reforms.65
A major source of pressure for national coverage decision-making has
been the medical device manufacturers who, as of 1976, had to get approval
from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before marketing new medical
devices.66 The fact that FDA approval did not necessarily result in Medicare
coverage and that further review for Medicare coverage purposes was required,
and was not always successful, confounded and frustrated medical device
manufacturers.67
Further, beneficiaries increasingly challenged negative coverage decisions
in court, and with some success.68 In 1987, as part of the settlement in Jameson
64. See Timothy P. Blanchard, "Medical Necessity" Denials as a Medicare Part B Cost-
Containment Strategy: Two Wrongs Don't Make It Right or Rational, 34 ST. Louis U. L. J. 939,
1002-12 (1990) (criticizing HCFA's refusal to disclose coverage criteria and guidelines);
Kinney, supra note 45, at 903 (commenting on calls for publication and accountability within
the various coverage policymaking processes); Sally Hart Wilson, Benefit Cutbacks in the
Medicare Program Through Administrative Agency Fiat Without Procedural Protections:
Litigation Approaches on BehaIf ofBeneficiaries, 16 GONZ. L. REV. 533,536 (198 1) (criticizing
the lack of administrative hearing rights and judicial review rights of the Medicare program).
65. See ADMIN. CONF. OF U.S., RECOMMENDATION 87-8, NATIONAL COVERAGE
DETERMINATIONS UNDER THE MEDICARE PROGRAM, 52 Fed. Reg. 49,144 (Dec. 30, 1987)
(expressing concerns about and suggesting reforms for HCFA's coverage decision-making
process); ADMIN. CONF. OF U.S., RECOMMENDATION 86-5, NATIONAL MEDICARE APPEALS, 51
Fed. Reg. 46,987 (same); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, RECOMMENDATIONS ON MEDICARE
PROCEDURES BY THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES (Aug. 1988) (same).
66. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (noting that Congress enacted the Medical
Device Amendments of 1976 to evaluate new medical devices).
67. See Bradley Merrill Thompson & Brian A. Dahl, The Perspective of Manufacturers,
in GUIDE TO MEDICARE COVERAGE DECISION-MAKING AND APPEALS 127, 127-28 (Eleanor D.
Kinney ed., 2002) (noting that many manufacturers support Medicare coverage based on FDA
approval).
68. See, e.g., Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602,627 (1984) (requiring that administrative
remedies be exhausted before judicial review of the Secretary's decisions in the context of
coverage denial for a surgical procedure); Linoz v. Heckler, 800 F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 1986)
(deeming a coverage determination to be a substantive rule and reversing a grant of summary
judgment for the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services); Vorster v.
Bowen, 709 F. Supp. 934, 947 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (deciding that review determination notices
must contain language indicating that a frequency of service was exceeded and requesting
additional confirmation from the beneficiary to show medical necessity); Griffith v. Bowen, 678
F. Supp. 942, 947 (D. Mass. 1988) (refusing to dismiss a class action brought against the
Secretary of Health and Human Services for coverage denials on the grounds of subject matter
jurisdiction or mootness); Jameson v. Bowen, No. CV-F-8-547, 1987 WL 108970, at *1 (E.D.
Cal. Feb. 20, 1987) (reaching a settlement agreement under which HCFA was required to
publish coverage decision procedures); Leduc v. Harris, 488 F. Supp. 588,591 (D. Mass. 1980)
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v. Bowen,69 which contested the application of a national coverage policy,
HCFA promulgated a notice explaining its procedures for making coverage
decisions.70 In this notice, HCFA stated its intention to promulgate a rule for
making national coverage determinations.
In 1986, when it established administrative and judicial review for Part B
claims, Congress expressly exempted HCFA national coverage determinations
from judicial challenges on grounds that they were not promulgated as
legislative rules under § 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).7'
Congress's rationale for this special treatment of national coverage decisions
was that HCFA had an established process for the solicitation of medical input
from private medical organizations and the Public Health Service.72 Since then,
federal courts have uniformly upheld this amendment and the authority of
HCFA to make coverage decisions without using APA rulemaking
procedures.73
Following the Jameson decision, HCFA was unsuccessful in developing a
formal procedure for making national coverage determinations. In 1989,
HCFA published a notice of proposed rulemaking, which was never
promulgated as a final rule, to make a more public, accountable process for
making national and local coverage policy for the Medicare program.74 The
proposed rule, adopted in response to Jameson, proved controversial chiefly
(determining that a denial of reimbursement for an electric wheelchair operated as a violation of
due process while a denial of reimbursement for an electronically operated bed was not); see
also Kinney, supra note 45, at 918-23 (outlining judicial challenges to Medicare coverage
policy).
69. Jameson v. Bowen, No. CV-F-8-547, 1987 WL 108970 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 1987).
70. See Medicare Program; Procedures for Medical Services Coverage Decisions; Request
for Comments, 52 Fed. Reg. 15,560, 15,561-63 (Apr. 29, 1987) (presenting HCFA's notice
explaining its procedures for making coverage decisions).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(b)(2)(C) & (b)(4) (2000); see also 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994)
(providing definition of legislative rules).
72. H.R. REP. No. 99-102, at 350-51 (1986).
73. See, e.g., St. Francis Health Care Ctr. v. Shalala, 205 F.3d 937, 947 (6th Cir. 2000)
(determining that the HCFA was not required to comply with the APA's notice and comment
procedures in denying St. Francis's requests for an "upward adjustment" to its costs limits
because the denial was an interpretive rule); Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 73, 75 (1 st Cir. 1998)
(holding that a specific administrative ruling by the HCFA classifying a piece of equipment as
"'durable medical equipment' rather than 'braces' . . . [was] an interpretive rule and was not
invalidated by HCFA's failure to have adopted notice and comment procedures").
74. See Medicare Program; Criteria and Procedures for Making Medical Services
Coverage Decisions that Relate to Health Care Technology, 54 Fed. Reg. 4302 (proposed Jan.




because of its articulation of cost effectiveness as a criteria for making coverage
decisions.75
Following publication of the 1989 proposed rule, HCFA made the process
more regular and established an internal review process with its Technical
Advisory Committee (TAC), which is comprised of carrier medical directors,
including a medical director of a managed care organization and representatives
of other interested federal agencies.76 This committee met out of public view
and its recommendations were not binding on HCFA.77
Through the 1990s, HCFA continued to struggle with designing a
coverage decision-making process that responded to the concerns of
beneficiaries, device manufacturers, and other critics while maintaining tight
control over decision-making. In 1998, the U.S. General Accounting Office
(GAO) reported that the TAC violated the Federal Advisory Committee Act.7s
Following this report, HCFA appointed a Medicare Coverage Advisory
Committee (MCAC). The MCAC, comprised of outside experts, conducted
public meetings on coverage issues and permitted manufacturers and other
interested parties to present their views.79
In the late 1990s, the Republican-dominated House Ways and Means
Committee put great pressure on HCFA to reform its coverage decision-making
and appeals processes. The Health Subcommittee held multiple hearings on the
coverage decision-making and appeals processes.80 Much of this activity was
75. See Darrel J. Grinstead, Evolution ofthe Medicare Coverage Policy-MakingProcess,
in GUIDE TO MEDICARE COVERAGE DECISION-MAKING AND APPEALS 1,9-13 (Eleanor D. Kinney
ed., 2002) (discussing the 1989 proposed rule, which included a controversial cost-effectiveness
requirement).
76. Issues Relating to Medicare's Coverage Policy, Hearing Before the Health
Subcommittee ofthe House Committee on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. 12 (1997) (statement
of Hon. Bruce C. Vladeck, Administrator, Health Care Financing Administration); see
Grinstead, supra note 75, at 14 (discussing TAC's membership and role in the coverage
decision-making process).
77. See Grinstead, supra note 75, at 14 (discussing TAC's membership and role in the
coverage decision-making process).
78. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT: VIOLATION BY THE
HEALTH CARE FINANCING ADM[MSTRATION 1-2 (1998); see Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5
U.S.C. app. 2 (2000) (regulating those groups that advise agencies of the executive branch).
79. Medicare Program; Establishment of the Medicare Coverage Advisory Committee and
Request for Nominations for Members, 63 Fed. Reg. 68,780 (proposed Dec. 14, 1998).
80. See Patient Appeals in Health Care: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Health
House Committee on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. 4-76 (1998) (providing testimony of
several witnesses on due process in patient appeals); The Medicare Coverage Decisions and
Beneficiary Appeals: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Health House Committee on Ways
and Means, 106th Cong. 21-128 (1999) [hereinafter Medicare Coverage Decisions] (providing
testimony from six witnesses discussing the procedural problems HCFA faces and the
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encouraged by the health equipment manufacturing industry." In April 1999,
in response to pressure from the subcommittee, HCFA published a notice (the
April 1999 Notice) that outlined the administrative process for making national
coverage policy. 8 2 In 2000, Congress changed the national coverage decision-
making process to provide more accessibility to interested parties, namely
medical device manufacturers, and imposed deadlines and other formal hearing
requirements on HCFA to make it more accountable for its decisions. 83 This
legislation was quite responsive to the health equipment manufacturing
industry's concerns with the Medicare coverage decision-making and appeals
processes.
1. The April 1999 Notice
In April 1999, CMS initiated a four-step plan to create a coverage
decision-making process that was "open, accountable, clear and dependable."
8 4
First, CMS created a new decision-making process. Second, CMS continued
the MCAC, comprised of "leading private sector experts on health care
coverage" and dedicated to review relevant scientific evidence and advise CMS
on whether Medicare should cover a particular service or item. Third, CMS
published a Notice of Intent that would lead to a proposed rule on the criteria
for making coverage decisions. The final step was a final rule on criteria with
sector-specific guidance.85
procedures HCFA created in the April 1999 notice).
81. See Press Release, Health Industry Manufacturers Association, Medical Device
Industry Applauds Representative Thomas' Efforts on Medicare Appeals, at
www.advamed.org/publicdocs/williamthomasrelease62499.htm (June 24, 1999) (supporting a
House bill titled "Medicare Appeals Act of 1999").
82. Medicare Program; Procedures for Making National Coverage Decisions, 64 Fed.
Reg. 22,619 (April 27, 1999), revised, Medicare Program; Revised Process for Making
Medicare National Coverage Decisions, 68 Fed. Reg. 55,634 (Sept. 26, 2003); see infra Part
lIB. I (outlining April 1999 notice).
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a) (2000) (requiring notice and comment on national coverage
determinations, on-the-record advisory committees, review of applicable scientific data, and a
clear statement of the reasons behind determinations).
84. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., FACT SHEET: MEDICARE'S PROCESS FOR
MAKrNG COVERAGE DECISIONS, at http://cms.hms.gov/media/press/release.asp?Counter-381
(May 1, 2000).
85. In its September 2003 notice, CMS announced that it would not pursue this
rulemaking due to the fact that "there are substantial competing interests about the coverage
criteria." Medicare Program; Revised Process for Making Medicare National Coverage
Decisions, 68 Fed. Reg. 55,634, 55,634-35 (Sept. 26, 2003).
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These new procedures made major changes to the Medicare coverage
decision-making process 86 and form the basis of the current coverage decision-
making process. Figure 1 is a diagram of the coverage decision-making process
established in the April 1999 Notice.
Figure 1: Medicare National Coverage Decision-Making Process
(April 1999 Notice)
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The major changes established in the April 1999 Notice specify
procedures for making coverage policy decisions and guaranteeing input from
beneficiaries and other interested parties through open meetings of the
86. See Procedures for Making National Coverage Decisions, 64 Fed. Reg. 22,619,
22,620 (proposed April 27, 1999) (stating that the goal of the new rule is to make the decision-
making process "more open, responsive, and understandable to the public"); Grant Bagley,
Current Procedures and Standards for Making Medicare Coverage Decisions, in GUIDE TO
MEDICARE COVERAGE DECISIoN-MAKrNG AND APPEALS, 17, 18-20 (Eleanor D. Kinney ed.,
2002) (discussing the impact of the April 1999 notice).
87. Notice, Procedures for Making National Coverage Decisions, 64 Fed. Reg. 22,619
(Apr. 27, 1999).
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MCAC.88 The April 1999 Notice specifically authorizes any person to request
a national coverage decision.8 9 The majority of requests come from medical
device manufacturers, with physicians or their organizations a distant second.90
CMS can, and often does, initiate a request for a national coverage decision.91
In addition, the April 1999 Notice establishes a ninety-day time frame, starting
at the "acceptance" of the request for making a final coverage decision.92
Several events, such as the receipt of significant new information, can toll the
ninety days. Device manufacturers oppose these exceptions because CMS
often invokes them and eviscerates the deadline.93 Pursuant to the April 1999
Notice, CMS can refer a coverage request to the MCAC which can add an
additional three to six months to the decision-making process.94 When a
particularly controversial case presents a serious scientific question about the
effectiveness of a new technology, CMS can request a technology assessment
through the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. 95 A technology
96assessment can add three to twelve months to the process.
The April 1999 Notice added a new process for reconsideration of
negative coverage decisions in the event of new evidence or material
reinterpretation of old evidence.97 This process enables interested parties to
reopen coverage decisions if they have more evidence.
Pursuant to the April 1999 Notice, CMS publishes requests for coverage
policy on the CMS web page and also maintains a docket of deliberations on
requests for coverage on the internet. 98 This step has done much to address a
88. The Medicare Coverage Process and Beneficiary Processes: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Health of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 22 (1999)
(statement of Michael Hash, Deputy Administrator, Health Care Financing Administration).
89. Id.
90. See Bagley, supra note 86, at 22 (stating that coverage decision requests usually come
from manufacturers).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 20.
93. Thompson & Dahl, supra note 67, at 130 (describing the national decision-making
process as inefficient and sometimes longer than the product life cycle for many devices).
94. Notice, Establishment of the Medicare Coverage Advisory Committee and Request for
Nominations for Members, 63 Fed. Reg. 68,780 (Dec. 14, 1998).
95. Procedures for Making National Coverage Decisions, 64 Fed. Reg. 22,619,22,623-24
(proposed Apr. 27, 1999); see Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, at http://
www.ahrq.gov/clinic/techix.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2003) (stating that the agency conducts
technology assessments for CMS and listing completed technology assessments).
96. 64 Fed. Reg. at 22,624.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 22,622; see CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE COVERAGE
HOME PAGE, at http://cms.hhs.gov/coverage/default2.asp (last visited Sept. 2,2003) (providing
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prior criticism of the process-namely that CMS made decisions in secret and
interested parties did not have an opportunity to provide input. The publication
requirement does much to enhance the transparency of the national coverage
decision-making process.
Finally, the process enunciated in the April 1999 Notice establishes a high
evidentiary burden for demonstrating that Medicare should cover a new
medical technology. This evidentiary burden has been most controversial
among device manufacturers and also physicians.9 9 They claim that CMS
expects empirical analysis, which is expensive and difficult to obtain, to
demonstrate the effectiveness of the new technology.1°°
2. Section 522 of BIPA
The Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and
Protection Act of 2000 (BIPA)'0 ' established statutory requirements for the
national and local coverage decision-making processes. While CMS had
already adopted many of the BIPA reforms in the April 1999 Notice, CMS now
has a statutory mandate to operate an open process rather than an option to do
so. °2 Specifically, in making a national coverage determination, the Secretary
must "ensure that the public is afforded notice and opportunity to comment"
and that determinations are made "on the record."'0 3 Further, in making the
determination, the Secretary must consider "applicable information (including
clinical experience and medical, technical, and scientific evidence)" and
"provide a clear statement of the basis for the determination (including
responses to comments received from the public)" as well as "the assumptions
underlying that basis."'04 The Secretary must make the data that he or she used
in making the decision available to the public.'05
Most importantly, BIPA empowered beneficiaries to challenge both
national and local coverage decisions independent of explicit coverage denials
access to, among other things, NCDs, technology assessments, and Federal Register notices).
99. Rachel F. Ochs-Ross & Thomas A. Connaughton, The Perspective of Providers, in
GUIDE TO MEDICARE COVERAGE DECISION-MAKING AND APPEALS, 105, 105-07 (Eleanor D.
Kinney ed., 2002).
100. See id. at 111-13 (discussing criticisms of CMS's coverage criteria).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a) (2000).
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in the context of claims. 0 6 Specifically, an aggrieved party-a Medicare
beneficiary in need of an item or service-can invoke this appeals process.' 01
An aggrieved party can initiate an appeal of an implemented national coverage
determination to the Departmental Appeals Board (DAB) for the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).' °8 DAB has de novo review
and can consult with scientific and clinical experts, permit discovery, and take
evidence to evaluate the reasonableness of the determination.'0 9 A DAB
decision constitutes the final HHS action for which judicial review is
available."O An aggrieved party similarly can appeal a local coverage
determination made by Medicare contractors to an administrative law judge
(ALJ) who adjudicates other Medicare appeals."' The reviewing ALJ has the
same latitude of review for local coverage determinations as the DAB has for
national coverage decisions." 2  The ALJ decision on a local coverage
determination is then reviewable by the DAB." 3 A DAB decision on the local
coverage determination constitutes the final HHS action for which judicial
review is available.1 4 Under current law, an ALJ does not have authority to
adjudicate a national coverage determination. 15
3. The August 2002 Proposed Rule
CMS did not implement the BIPA reforms immediately. In 2001, CMS
issued a ruling explaining that it would delay implementation of the BIPA
reforms and established procedures for handling any beneficiary challenges to
national or local coverage decisions." 6 CMS claimed that Congress did not
appropriate the requisite resources to implement the mandate, stating:
"[A]bsent new funding sources, CMS is unable to implement many of these far-
106. See 42 U.S.C. § 1935ff(b)(1)(A) (2000) (stating that any individual is entitled to
reconsideration of a coverage determination).
107. Id.
108. Id. § 1395ff(f)(l)(A)(iii).
109. Id.
110. Id. § 1395ff(f)(l)(A)(v).
111. Id. § 1395ff(f)(2)(A)(i).
112. See id. (permitting the ALJ to consult with experts, conduct discovery, and evaluate
the reasonableness of the determination).
113. Id. § 1395fff)(2)(A)(ii).
114. Id. § 1395ff(0(2)(A)(iv).
115. See 42 U.S.C. § 1935fT(t) (2000) (granting DAB the sole authority to review NCDs).
116. Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Ruling 01-01, http://cms.hhs.gov
/rulings/01-01.asp (Sept. 28, 2001).
1480
MEDICARE COVERAGE DECISION-MAKING
reaching changes."" ' 7 CMS has been particularly reluctant to implement the
provisions that allow beneficiaries to initiate processes for making national and
local coverage decisions when they are directly affected by a coverage decision.
Indeed, CMS only published the proposed rule in August 2002 after multiple
advocacy groups representing the disabled threatened to bring a class action
suit to compel promulgation of a rule to implement these procedures."'8
In August 2002, CMS issued a proposed rule implementing some of the
BIPA mandated reforms." 9  The proposed rule defined which Medicare
beneficiaries qualified as "aggrieved parties" and specified the process for
challenging national coverage determinations and local coverage decisions
outside the current appeals process for Medicare claim denials.,20 Specifically,
the proposed rule requires that in order to invoke the process, aggrieved parties
must obtain certifications from treating physicians and other evidence of need
for an item or service.12' These requirements and others have generated
considerable opposition from the health equipment manufacturers who charge
that these requirements eviscerate the BIPA process.
22
117. Notice of CMS Ruling, The National and Local Coverage Determination Review
Process for an Individual with Standing as Defined in Section 522 of the Medicare, Medicaid,
and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protections Act of 2000, 66 Fed. Reg. 54,253 (Oct. 26,
2001).
118. See Press Release, American Association of People With Disabilities, AAPD Plaintiff
in Lawsuit Filed Today Against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), at
http://www.aapd.com/docs/aapdplaintiffagainsthhs.htm (Aug. 6, 2002) (announcing that
AAPD, the American Council of the Blind, the Gray Panthers, and three individual Medicare
beneficiaries had filed a lawsuit against HHS); see also Markian Hawryluk, Medicare Denials
Can Be Appealed: CMS Acts Following Lawsuit: The Right to Appeal Is Seen as Essential to
Ensuring that Medicare Allows Physicians to Provide the Best Treatments, and Get
Reimbursed, AM. MED. NEWS, http://www.amaassn.org/sci-pubs/amnews/pick02/gvl 10902.htm
(Sept. 2, 2002) (discussing reactions to CMS's national coverage decision-making process).
119. Medicare Program; Review of National Coverage Determinations and Local Coverage
Determinations, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,534 (proposed Aug. 22, 2002).
120. Id. at 54,538, 54,540-46.
121. Id. at 54,540.
122. Memorandum from the Advanced Medical Technology Association to Thomas A.
Scully, Administrator, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, HHS (Oct. 21, 2002) (on
file with the author); Letter from Carl B. Feldbaum, President, Biotechnology Industry
Organization to Thomas A. Scully, Administrator, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
HHS, Comments on CMS-3063-P (Medicare Program; Review of National Coverage
Determinations and Local Coverage Determinations) (Oct. 18, 2002) (on file with the author);
Letter from Rachel S. Kramer, RHIA, American College of Radiology (and for the American
Society of Neuroradiology; American Society for Therapeutic Radiology and Oncology; and the
Society of Nuclear Medicine) to Thomas A. Scully, Administrator, Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services, HHS, Comments on Review of National Coverage Determinations and
Local Coverage Determinations; Proposed Rule (CMS-3063-P) (Oct. 22, 2002) (on file with the
author).
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4. The September 2003 Notice
In September 2003, CMS issued a notice revising the procedures for making
Medicare coverage decisions stated in its April 1999 Notice. 23 Essentially, the
coverage process remains the same except for the following improvements. The
September 2003 Notice reorganizes the instructions on the reconsideration process and
distinguishes this process from an initial request to make an NCD.'24 Also, the notice
more clearly identifies the elements of a complete, formal request for an NCD
including the requirement that the request include all evidence currently available and
the evidence must be adequate for CMS to determine that the item or service is
reasonable and necessary.12s The major change in the September 2003 Notice is the
establishment of two main tracks for the initial NCD request. 126 One track is a "highly
time-structured track" only available to aggrieved parties who have the right to
immediate appeal of a coverage determination under § 522 of BIPA.'27 The other
track is open to anyone, including aggrieved parties, beneficiaries, and manufacturers,
and offers a "more collaborative and less time-stringent" process."'
C The Medicare Part B Beneficiary Appeals Process
From the perspective of Medicare coverage decisions, the most important
appeals process is the Part B beneficiary appeals process. 129 The Social Security
Amendments of 1965 expressly provided that beneficiaries under Parts A and B could
obtain administrative and judicial review of any determination regarding eligibility for
benefits as well as the amount ofbenefits under the appeals provisions in § 205 of the
Social Security Act. 30 For Part B, the legislation also required that carriers establish
fair hearing procedures for beneficiaries' disputes over payments and claims.''
123. Medicare Program; Revised Process for Making Medicare National Coverage
Decisions, 68 Fed. Reg. 55,634 (Sept. 26, 2003).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 55,638.
127. Id.; see supra notes 111-14 and accompanying text (discissing appeals process under
§ 522 of BIPA).
128. Medicare Program; Revised Process for Making Medicare National Coverage
Decisions, 68 Fed. Reg. 55,634 (Sept. 26, 2003).
129. Eleanor D. Kinney, Medicare Beneficiary Appeal Processes in GUIDE TO MEDICARE
COVERAGE DECISION-MAKING AND APPEALS 65, 66 (Eleanor D. Kinney ed., 2002). Much of the
material in this Section is based on this chapter.
130. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b)(g), 1395f(d), (0 (2000).
131. See id. § 1395u(b)(3)(C) (requiring a fair hearing when the amount in controversy is
greater than $ 100 and less than $500).
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Further, only beneficiaries had the ight to appeal a Part B claim; the providers and
supplier could appeal the beneficiary's claim if they had accepted assignment of the
claim. 32 Beneficiaries could not challenge the Medicare program in court outside this
appeals process due to the explicit bar in the Social Security Act to federal question
jurisdiction for independent challenges.
133
In 1972, due to the high volume of small Part B appeals, Congress eliminated
administrative and judicial review for Part B claims.3 4 Part B appeals were limited to
the fair hearing procedures before carriers. By the mid-1980s, however, there was
much concern about the fairness of the Part B appeals process and in particular, the
lack of access to further administrative and judicial review for Part B claims.'35
In the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 (OBRA 86), Congress
established administrative review for claims over $500 and judicial review for claims
over $1,000.136 HCFA retained carrier hearings for all Part B claims prior to
administrative review even though OBRA 86 required fair hearings only for claims
under $500.' OBRA 86 also imposed significant limitations on administrative and
judicial review of national coverage determinations."3 Specifically, these limits
precluded judicial review of Medicare's national coverage determinations as well as
procedural challenges of national coverage determinations for failure to comply with
APA and other statutory rulemaking procedures. 3 9 Also, OBRA 86 required a court
to remand a challenged national coverage determination back to HCFA for
132. See id. § 1395u(b)(3) (granting the right to a fair hearing only to enrolled individuals);
Grinstead, supra note 75, at 6 (explaining the Medicare appeals process).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (2000).
134. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 2990, 86 Stat. 1329,
1464-65 (1972) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(b) (2000)).
135. See Medicare Appeals Provisions: Hearings Before the Health Subcomm of the
Senate Fin. Comm., 99th Cong. 270 (1985) (statement of P. John Seward, M.D., Vice
Chairman, Council on Legislation, American Medical Association) (supporting proposal to
provide recourse for beneficiaries and physicians after denial of benefits at carrier hearing).
136. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9341(a), 100
Stat. 1874, 2037 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395(b) (2000)).
137. Hearings by Administrative Law Judges of Certain Medicare Claims, 53 Fed. Reg.
20,023, 20,024 (proposed June 1,1988); see Isaacs v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 468,477 (2d Cir. 1989)
(upholding HCFA's authority to retain this step).
138. See Isaacs, 865 F.2d at 471 (citing additional amount in controversy requirements on
fair hearings and ALJ and judicial review).
139. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (stating that Congress expressly exempted
challenges of national coverage determinations for failure to comply with § 553 of the APA).
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amplification before invalidating it on any grounds. 140 Courts have generally upheld
these requirements.
141
Currently, the Part B beneficiary appeals process proceeds as follows.
First, if the amount in controversy is between $100 and $500, there is a fair
hearing before the carrier. 142 After the carrier's final disposition, a
beneficiary can appeal an adverse determination if the amount in
controversy is $100 or more to an ALJ within the Social Security
Administration. 143 Judicial review is available for disputes of $1,000 or
more after a prior internal appeal to the DAB.
44
Despite the addition of administrative and judicial review, the Part B
appeals process continued to be problematic. 45 The GAO criticized the
process as unduly lengthy.146 In the 1980s, the Administrative Conference
of the United States and the American Bar Association recommended
changes to the OBRA 86 limitations and other reforms.
147
Judicial challenges to the Part B appeals procedures persisted as
well. 48 In the 1980s, several Supreme Court decisions addressed Part B
140. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9341(a), 100 Stat. 1874,
2038 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395(b)).
141. See, e.g., Nat'l Kidney Patients Ass'n v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1127, 1133 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (stating thatjudicial "review simply awaits initial administrative determination [of Part B
claims] in a concrete setting"); Abby v. Sullivan, 978 F.2d 37, 44 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that
courts ordinarily give an agency the opportunity to review applications of its rules); Roen v.
Sullivan, 764 F.Supp. 555, 560 (D. Minn. 1991) (concluding that the court did not have subject
matter jurisdiction because plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(3)(C) (2000).
143. Id. § 1395ff(b)(1)(E)(i).
144. Id.
145. See generally Adjudicatory Procedures ofthe Dep 't ofHealth & Human Servs. Before
the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Gov't Relations of the House Judiciary Comm., 101 st Cong.
(1989) (containing testimony on timeliness and quality of hearings).
146. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STATISTICS ON THE PART B ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGE HEARINGS PROCESS (1989).
147. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing concerns with HCFA's closed
coverage decision-making process).
148. See, e.g., Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 73, 83 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding agency's
interpretive rule was not binding on courts but deserving of deference); Friedrich v. Sec'y
Health & Human Services, 894 F.2d 829, 834 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that § 9341 (b) of OBRA
allows a court to hold a national coverage determination issued before 1987 unlawful for
inadequate notice and comment); Smith v. Thompson, 210 F. Supp. 2d 994, 1000 (N.D. Il1.
2002) (upholding Illinois ALJ's refusal to regard non-Illinois Medicare policies as precedent);
Estate of Aitken v. Shalala, 986 F. Supp. 57, 62 (D. Mass. 1997) (remanding national coverage
determinations back to HCFA because "there does not appear to be a relationship between the
agency's findings and the applicable criteria of judgment"); Matthews v. Shalala, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3111, at *6 (S.D.N.Y., Mar. 18, 1997) (stating that a court will uphold national
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beneficiary appeal procedures. In its 1982 decision, Schweiker v.
McClure,149 the Supreme Court concluded that carrier Part B hearing
procedures were sufficient from a due process perspective and further
administrative or judicial review was not constitutionally required. 15 0 In its
1984 decision, Heckler v. Ringer,15' the Supreme Court ruled that a
beneficiary could not challenge a national coverage decision in court
without exhausting administrative remedies due to the jurisdictional bar to
independent judicial challenges in the Social Security Act.' 52 Of note, in a
2000 decision,'53 the Supreme Court conclusively limited an earlier
decision that had effectively permitted judicial challenges to Medicare
policies outside the statutory appeals process and reasserted the statutory
bar to federal question jurisdiction in the Social Security Act.
15 4
By the late 1990s, the Republican Congress responded to concerns of health
industry manufacturers and expressed interest in reforming the Part B appeals process.
The Health Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways and Means held hearings
on the beneficiary appeals process and initiated reforms. 55 Ultimately, reforms to
beneficiary appeals processes for Parts A and B were included in BIPA.'
5 6
BIPA has consolidated the beneficiary appeals processes for Parts A and B
and mandated major reforms in the process.' 57 Figure 2 is a comparison of the
old Part B appeals process and the BIPA beneficiary appeals processes.
coverage determinations unless it finds the determination unsupported by adequate information
in the record, in which case the court will remand for further proceedings); Cedars-Sinai Med.
Ctr. v. Shalala, 939 F. Supp. 1459, 1465 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding agency rule invalid for
failure to comply with notice and comment requirements); Bosko v. Shalala, 995 F. Supp. 580,
583 (W.D. Pa. 1996) (upholding a national coverage determination that relied on
comprehensive analysis).
149. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982).
150. Id. at 200.
151. Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 619 (1984).
152. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (2000) (stating that findings of fact or law made by the
Commissioner of Social Security will not be reviewed).
153. Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 25 (2000).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h); see Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667,
678 (1986) (concluding "that those matters which Congress did not leave to be determined in a
'fair hearing' conducted by the carrier-including challenges to the validity of the Secretary's
instructions and regulations-are not impliedly insulated from judicial review by 42 U.S.C.
§ 13951W').
155. See, e.g., Patient Appeals in Health Care: Hearings before the Health Subcomm. of
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. 3-78 (1998) (examining the different
appeals procedures applied by Medicare and private insurers).
156. See U.S.C. § 1935ff(b)(l)(A) (2000) (allowing beneficiaries to appeal initial coverage
determinations).
157. Id.
60 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1461 (2003)































*Time in boxes represents time allowed to complete appeal.
**Time between boxes represents time allowed to file for appeal.
BIPA mandated the following reforms: (1) revised time limits for filing
appeals, (2) reduced decision-making time frames throughout all levels of the
Medicare administrative appeals system; and (3) establishment of "qualified
independent contractors" (QICs) to conduct reconsiderations of contractors'
initial determinations or redeterminations. The BIPA reforms only apply to the
appeal procedures under Parts A and B, leaving the Part C appeals procedures
for Medicare+Choice beneficiaries intact." 9
158. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., MEDICARE
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS: THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF BIPA, No. OEI-04-01-00290, at 10
(2002).
159. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 established grievance and appeal procedures for
Medicare+Choice plans., Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33 § 4001, 111 Stat.
251, 275-327 (1997) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-21); see generally Jennifer E. Gladieux,
Medicare+Choice Appeal Procedures: Reconciling Due Process Rights and Cost Containment,
25 AM. J. L. & MED. 61 (1999).
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Perhaps the most significant reform, which CMS has not implemented,160
is the creation of independent medical review for the reconsideration of initial
determinations of coverage in individual cases.' 6' Specifically, BIPA requires
that CMS contract with at least twelve QICs nationwide to conduct
reconsiderations of Medicare coverage determinations at the request of
beneficiaries or CMS.162 QICs must be organizations independent of any
existing Medicare contractors that make initial determinations' 6 and be
comprised of panels of physicians or other health care professionals.' 64 The
professional panels must have the ability to consider clinical experience and
medical, technical, and scientific evidence associated with reconsidered
coverage determinations. 65 Attending physicians cannot be involved in the
reconsideration. 66 The written reconsideration decision must include a detailed
explanation of the decision, a discussion of pertinent facts and regulations and,
where the issue is reasonable and necessary services, an explanation of the
scientific rationale. 67 A beneficiary can appeal the QIC decision to an ALJ
with further review by the DAB. 68
Under BIPA, both administrative and judicial review for claims over a
specified amount are available. A beneficiary is entitled to an ALJ hearing if
the amount in controversy is at least $100.169 Further, ALJs must make
decisions no later than ninety days after the hearing request, although the party
seeking the hearing may waive the time period. 70 If the deadline is not met,
the beneficiary may seek review by the DAB.17' The QIC becomes a party in
the ALJ hearing and prepares such information as is required for the appeal,
including, as necessary, an explanation of the issues and the relevant policies. 1
72
The QIC also participates in the hearings as required by HCFA. 73 The DAB
160. See infra note 181 and accompanying text (noting CMS has not yet implemented QIC
review).
161. 42 U.S.C. § 1935ff(b) (2000).
162. Id. § 1935ff(c)(3).
163. Id. § 1935ff(c)(2).
164. Id. § 1935ff(c)(3)(B)(i).
165. Id.
166. Id. § 1935ff(c)(3)(D)(i)(I).
167. Id. § 1935ff(c)(3)(E).
168. See id. § 1935ff(d) (providing ALJ review of the QIC decision and de novo DAB
review of the ALJ decision).
169. Id. § 1935fl(b)(1)(E)(i).
170. Id. § 1935f!(d)(1).
171. Id. § 1935ff(d)(3)(A).
172. Id § 1935ff(c)(3)(J).
173. Id.
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reviews the case de novo and must make a decision within ninety days of the
request. 74  If the deadline is not met, the beneficiary may seek judicial
review 175 if the amount in controversy is at least $1000.176 BIPA retains the
same limitations on judicial review of national coverage determinations
established in OBRA 86.177
BIPA contains crucial new provisions for provider representation of
beneficiaries. Of import, suppliers and providers can represent beneficiaries in
appeals and also appeal beneficiary claims for which the suppliers or providers
have accepted assignment. 178 Any provider or supplier representing a
beneficiary must waive any right to payment from the beneficiary with respect
to the services or items being appealed.179 Further, BIPA now imposes specific
mandates on CMS to inform beneficiaries, providers, and suppliers of their
appeal rights. 8 '
CMS has not yet implemented QIC review, stating it does not have the
resources to launch the requisite contracting process to bring QICs on line.' 8 '
Furthermore, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has criticized
implementation of QICs as very costly at a time of constrained resources.' 82
Nevertheless, in November 2002, CMS promulgated a proposed rule to
implement some of the changes of BIPA in the appeals process.'83 The
proposed rule establishes "a uniform process for handling all Part A and Part B
appeals; revised time limits for filing appeals; reduced decision-making time
174. Id. § 1935ff(d)(2).
175. Id. § 1935ff(d)(3)(8).
176. Id. § 1935ff(b)(1)(E)(i).
177. See id. § 1935ff(b)(l)(E)(i) (limiting the amount in controversy); supra note 138
(noting limitations on judicial and administrative review of national coverage determinations).
178. See 42 U.S.C. § 1935ff(b)(l)(C) (2000) (permitting a beneficiary to assign his right to
appeal to a provider or supplier).
179. Id. § 1935ff(b)(l)(B)(ii).
180. See id. § 1935ff(e)(2) (requiring the Secretary to employ sufficient means, including a
toll-free telephone number, to inform beneficiaries of their appeal rights).
181. Notice of CMS Ruling, The National and Local Coverage Determination Review
Process for an Individual with Standing as Defined in Section 522 of the Medicare, Medicaid,
and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protections Act of 2000, 66 Fed. Reg. 54,253 (Oct. 26,
2001).
182. See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., MEDICARE
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS: THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF BIPA, No. OEI-04-01-00290, 1, 14
(2002) (stating that the creation of QICs will have a significant cost and that Medicare is already
"backlogged, overwhelmed, and untimely"), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/ oeisearch.html.
183. Changes to the Medicare Claims Appeal Procedures, 67 Fed. Reg. 69,312 (Nov. 15,
2002) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 300).
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frames... [and] the introduction of new entities known as qualified
independent contractors (QICs) .... ""'
Finally, in the last three years, CMS has promoted legislative changes in
the beneficiary appeals process that would establish an AU corps within CMS
to adjudicate beneficiary appeals and institute other reforms."8 5 The most
recent incarnation of the proposed legislation includes increased funding for
training and support of Medicare ALJs, a process for expedited judicial review
of claims in which there is no factual dispute, and a requirement for the full and
early presentation of evidence at the first external level of appeal with
prohibitions against subsequent submission of information, except for good
cause. 8 6 The rationale for many of these reforms, from CMS's perspective, is
presented in a 1999 0IG report on Medicare appeals.'87 This report
recommended separating true beneficiary appeals from appeals involving
providers or suppliers, establishing an ALJ corps within CMS that is more
knowledgeable about the Medicare program policies and requirements,
requiring ALJs to follow the same standards as Medicare contractors, and
establishing a case precedent system for DAB rulings. 88
One major motive for these reforms is the increase in the number of
beneficiary appeals in recent years. Between 1996 and 1998, Part B appeals
increased 99%.189 ALJs reversed appeals of denials of durable medical
equipment in 78% of cases, leaving the OIG to comment: "Reversal rates of
this magnitude could encourage appellants."' 90 This comment begs the
question whether a review of coverage policy regarding DME might also be in
order as these reversal rates may represent a situation where beneficiaries are
not getting coverage of DME items that they clearly need in the view of the
ALJ.
184. Id. at 69,312.
185. See Medicare Regulatory and Contracting Reform Act of 2003, H.R. 810, 108th
Cong. § 401 (2003) (mandating development of a transition plan to transfer oversight of ALJs
conducting Medicare hearings from the Social Security Administration to the Department of
Health and Human Services); Medicare Regulatory and Contracting Reform Act of 2001, H.R.
2768, 107th Cong. § 8(g) (2001) (same).
186. H.R. 810 §§ 401-03.
187. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., MEDICARE
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS: AU HEARING PROCESS, No. OEI-04-97-00160, at 1-2 (Sept. 1999)
(listing findings of the Office of the Inspector General's evaluation of AU appeals for Medicare
Parts A and B), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei04-97-00160.pdf.
188. Id. at2.
189. Id. at 8.
190. ld. at 8.
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III. Does Process Meet the Challenge?
This section explores the foundational issues that animate the debate over
the Medicare decision-making and appeals processes. At this point, the debate
seems to be unresolvable. More process never seems to satisfy certain
Medicare constituencies, and CMS's effort to control the outcome of the
processes is relentlessly persistent.
As a framework for analysis of this debate, it is useful to proceed from the
Supreme Court's decision in Mathews v. Eldridge,19' with its three pronged
test to assess the constitutionality of government procedures under the
procedural Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution. While this test actually applies to adjudicative and not
policy-making procedures, it does represent one consensus on fair process from
a legal perspective. The Mathews analysis also serves as a useful vehicle for
sorting out the critical issues with respect to fairness of any process for
adjudicating disputes and, in particular, addresses the critical issues in the
debate over the Medicare coverage decision-making and appeals processes.
Specifically, the Mathews test calls for consideration of the following
three factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; Second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedures would entail. 1
92
The first and third factors call for an assessment of the interests of the private
parties and the government and the weighing of these interests. 193 The second
factor calls for an assessment of the process in terms of its ability to produce
accurate decisions, or at least to avoid erroneous deprivations of protected
interests.'94 This test is not without its critics for being a rather bloodless cost-
benefit analysis for determining the content of constitutional rights.' 95
191. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
192. Id. at 335.
193. See id. at 334 ("[R]esolution of the issue whether the administrative procedures
provided. . . are constitutionally sufficient requires analysis of the governmental and private
interests that are affected.").
194. See id. at 343-47 (discussing the evaluation of existing procedures).
195. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 189,
234-35 (1991) (characterizing the Mathews formula as a method of social welfare accounting
whereby individual claims are weighed against the government's costs of providing additional
process); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative
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A. The Interests of the Affected Constituencies
The first prong of the Mathews v. Eldridge test is analysis of the private
interest at stake.196 Analysis of this prong reveals a crucial dimension of the
debate: the parties with the greatest interests and stakes in the debate, health
care manufacturers, do not, under current law, have much, if any, constitutional
protection of their interests. Further, Medicare beneficiaries with the greatest
constitutional protection of their interest in Medicare benefits are least able to
articulate and promote those interests in the Medicare coverage decision-
making and appeals processes. 97 Physicians and other providers, who are in
the best position to advocate for beneficiaries, have only minimal and
derivative interests in Medicare benefits protected under federal law.
198
1. Beneficiaries
Medicare beneficiaries-those for whose benefit the program exists-have
the most important interest in the Medicare program.199 Courts have long
recognized that Medicare beneficiaries have a protected interest in receiving
their Medicare benefits. 200 Nevertheless, the degree to which beneficiaries have
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search ofa Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI.
L. REv. 28, 48 (1976) ("The Eldridge court conceives of the values of procedure too narrowly:
it views the sole purpose of procedural protections as enhancing accuracy, and thus limits its
calculus to the benefits or costs that flow from correct or incorrect decisions."); Richard B.
Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural
Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REv. I 11, 154-55 (1978) (arguing that the Mathews test is unsuitable
because it fails to protect the dignitary value of beneficiaries inasmuch as it sets that value off
against the cost of providing more process).
196. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
197. See Vicki Gottlich, The Perspective ofMedicare Beneficiaries, in GUIDE TO MEDICARE
COVERAGE DECISION-MAKING AND APPEALS 87, 89 (Eleanor D. Kinney ed., 2002) ("[E]ven if
beneficiaries have timely knowledge of a proceeding that would affect them, they generally lack
the resources to participate effectively in the process.").
198. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(f)(5) (2000) (granting standing for appeals of national
coverage decisions and local coverage decisions only to beneficiaries); see also Eleanor D.
Kinney, Medicare Beneficiary Appeals Processes, in GUIDE TO MEDICARE COVERAGE DECIsION-
MAKInG AND APPEALS 65, 69 (Eleanor D. Kinney ed., 2002) (explaining that providers do not
have standing to appeal coverage decisions and can only appeal the decisions if a beneficiary
assigns the claim to them).
199. See Gottlich, supra note 197, at 87 (stating that advocacy groups have brought
litigation on behalf of Medicare beneficiaries to challenge the processes used to determine
coverage decisions and appeals).
200. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (determining that due process
requires that recipients of public assistance benefits are entitled to an evidentiary hearing prior
to termination of benefits); see also O'Bannon v. Town Ct. Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 786-87
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an interest in coverage decisions, even in individual cases, is open to question
after the Supreme Court's decision in American Manufacturers Mutual
Insurance Co. v. Sullivan.20 In Sullivan, the Supreme Court ruled that a
private insurer's decision to withhold payment for disputed medical treatment
in a state-mandated workers' compensation program was not state action under
the procedural due process doctrine and that claimants had no property interest
in payment for medical treatment before the insurer's determination that the
service was reasonable and necessary.0 Sullivan begs the question of whether
the beneficiaries' entitlement exists only after the decision on coverage has
been made. If so, a beneficiary arguably would not be entitled to a review of a
decision on coverage in any event.
The medical nature of the beneficiary's interest diminishes its effective
articulation and protection in the coverage decision-making process as well as
in the appeals process. Specifically, beneficiaries generally do not have the
requisite medical expertise to assess their need for specific procedures, devices
or other technologies or articulate those needs in the coverage decision-making
and appeal process.0 3 They must necessarily rely on the medical profession for
expertise to define and articulate their needs for health care services. Even
beneficiary advocacy organizations need medical expertise to represent
beneficiaries adequately in coverage decision-making proceedings. Indeed,
Medicare beneficiary advocates have been largely absent in national and local
coverage decision-making proceedings. But they have been very active and
effective in helping individual beneficiaries in their appeals of coverage
decisions.2°
(1980) (explaining that due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before the
government can withdraw the direct benefits of Medicare or Medicaid from a recipient); Gray
Panthers v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 146, 172 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding that elderly persons
permanently denied statutory insurance benefits financed by the federal government have a
protected interest entitling them to notice of the evidence used to determine denial of their
benefits and an opportunity to present evidence on their own behalf).
201. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999).
202. See id. at 43-44; see also Grijalva v. Shalala, 526 U.S. 1096, 1096 (1996) (invoking
the decision in Sullivan in remanding the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit). The Ninth Circuit had ruled that extant Medicare HMO grievance and appeal
procedures failed to secure minimum due process for Medicare beneficiaries on several grounds
and that HMO service denials constituted federal action for purposes of the procedural due
process clause. Grijalva v. Shalala, 152 F.3d 1115, 1120 (9th Cir. 1998).
203. See Gottlich, supra note 197, at 89 (explaining that beneficiary involvement in
coverage decision-making is rare because beneficiaries usually are not aware that they need a
certain treatment at the time the rulemaking decision is being considered). Even if the
beneficiaries know they need the treatment, they cannot effectively participate in the process
because they lack the proper resources. Id.
204. See id. at 87 (stating that public interest organizations work on behalf of beneficiaries
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Another important characteristic of Medicare beneficiaries is their relative
economic and social vulnerability as a group. However, the Medicare
beneficiaries as a group are not monolithic. Important differences in this group
could have a substantial effect on the debate over Medicare coverage decision-
making in the future. The most important difference is the evolving divide in
incomes of. Medicare beneficiaries. Today, nearly 65% of Medicare
beneficiaries have incomes at or under $25,000, while 16% have incomes of
$40,001 or more.20 5 Projections on the demographics of Medicare beneficiaries
in the future suggest that many will be very affluent.2 °6 One study reported that
by 2015, elderly persons with an annual income less than $20,000 will drop to
38%, while 30% will have incomes over $40,000, and that by 2030,30% of the
elderly will earn less than $20,000, while those with incomes greater than
$40,000 will reach 36%.2o7 Further, the numbers of elderly with total assets
exceeding $150,000 will more than triple-moving from 13.2 million in 2000
to 44.5 million in 2030.20 The study predicts that "many elders in the future
will be able to pay for both necessary services such as long-term care and
discretionary, uncovered services., 209 The study also warns that "[w]ithout
major changes in the way we pay for healthcare, however, multiple-tier
medicine will become more and more pronounced."
2 10
Income inequity among the elderly could adversely affect the advocacy of
the interests of Medicare beneficiaries. If affluent beneficiaries are able to
purchase health care services or private coverage independent of the Medicare
program, they will have less incentive to advocate for Medicare coverage of
new medical procedures, devices and other new technologies. Empirically-
based social theory on the effects of inequality in societal income suggests that
when the social leadership gets so rich that it need not rely on public programs
for basic needs, it loses interest in the public sector, thereby denying the public
sector of leadership and advocacy.21' In the case of the Medicare program, lack
to challenge Medicare coverage and appeals procedures).
205. OFFICE OF RESEARCH, DEV. & INFO., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
Program Information on Medicare, Medicaid, SCHIP, and Other Programs of the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services § 3.B. 1, at 7 (June 2002).
206. See James R. Knickman et al., Wealth Patterns Among Elderly Americans:
Implications for Health Care Affordability, HEALTH AFF., May/June 2003, 168, 169 exhibit I
(showing the distribution and projected distribution of income for all elderly persons for the
years 2000, 2015 and 2030).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 172.
209. Id. at 171.
210. Id. at 172.
211. See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, J.
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of such leadership could lead to Medicare's transition to a needs-based welfare
program like the Medicaid program, with more limited coverage of new
medical procedures, devices, and technology. Providers and manufacturers
with access to a large class of affluent patients with the ability to pay for or
obtain private coverage of new medical technologies could have diminished
interest in pressing for coverage of new technologies in the Medicare program.
Such an eventuality could result in compromised access to many new
technologies for low and middle income elderly who rely only on the Medicare
program for their health coverage.
2. Providers
Physicians and other providers of health care services under Part B have a
derivative interest in the Medicare program."'2 Historically, the courts have
ruled that neither physicians nor other institutional providers have a protected
entitlement in Medicare payments protected under the procedural due process
clause.213 But recently, in Fischer v. United States,214 the Supreme Court
acknowledged that providers do have a recognized interest in Medicare benefits
beyond compensation for services.215 The Court has not specified how this
observation translates into additional rights of providers to represent patients
and advocate for coverage of new procedures, devices, or technology.
Experience with Part B of the Medicare program has demonstrated that
physicians, in their roles as certifiers of needed Medicare benefits for
beneficiaries 216 and as patient advocates under ethical codes of the medical
DEMOCRACY 65, 65-78 (Jan. 1995) (arguing that social capital has declined in recent decades
and suggesting further studies to explore the effects of weak civil societies). See generally ThE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INEQUALITY (Frank Ackerman et al. eds., 2000) (analyzing the causes
and consequences of inequality in the United States and around the world).
212. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (identifying Part B).
213. See St. Francis Hosp. Ctr. v. Heckler, 714 F.2d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding that
due process does not require that non-proprietary hospitals receive a return on equity capital);
Geriatrics, Inc. v. Harris, 640 F.2d 262, 265 (10th Cir. 1981) (determining that a nursing home
which received Medicaid funds was not entitled to a hearing before termination of those funds).
214. Fischer v. United States, 529 U.S. 667 (2000).
215. See id. at 673 (stating that healthcare providers receive Medicare funds not only as
compensation for services rendered, but also to fund programs that enable the provider to
continue offering quality services).
216. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395g(a) (2000) (stating that providers cannot be paid for services
rendered until they have "furnished such information as the Secretary may request in order to
determine the amounts due such provider").
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profession, 217 have an important role in the Medicare coverage decision-making
and appeals processes. Indeed, given that physicians are the sole repository of
information and that they must make a judgment about whether a procedure is
reasonable and necessary in the diagnosis or treatment of disease or injury, the
role of physicians in these processes is essential. As discussed above, the
coverage decision-making process invites and indeed heavily relies on the input
of the medical profession and its associations and specialty societies in making
national and local coverage decisions, particularly if a formal assessment of the
new technology is required. 18
With respect to the appeals of coverage decisions for cases of individual
beneficiaries, which might result in diminished or no Medicare payment for a
physician under Part B, physicians have only derivative appeal rights.2" 9 They
may only appeal beneficiary claims for which they have accepted assignment of
the beneficiary's right of reimbursement.220 Yet it is often important for a
beneficiary's physician to participate in an appeal to address the medical issues
which are beyond lay expertise.
Many factors limit the interests of physicians in mounting or participating
in a beneficiary's appeal of a coverage denial. First, the physician's payment
for the care of Medicare beneficiaries is based on the resources that the
physician used to treat an episode of illness and generally not on a specific
procedure. 22' Therefore, only when a physician wants to perform a specific
procedure that is the subject of a national or local coverage decision, or is so
new that it does not fit within existing codes and comes to the attention of the
carrier, does coverage of a procedure become an important economic concern
to physicians.
The regulations governing beneficiary appeal procedures make it difficult
for physicians to participate in beneficiary appeals. Physicians cannot initiate
appeals of coverage decisions, but can only participate in beneficiary-initiated
217. See William M. Sage, Physicians as Advocates, 35 Hous. L. REv. 1529, 1542-43
(1999) ("In this newer version [of medical ethics], the medical profession continues to assert a
general right to oversee clinical care, but also frames itself as an advocate for patients .... ").
218. See supra notes 59-60, 72, 86 and accompanying text (providing examples of
physicians and others in medical profession giving input to decision-making process).
219. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (stating that while physicians are in the
best position to advocate for beneficiaries, they only have derivative interests in Medicare
benefits).
220. See id. (explaining that providers can only appeal the decision if a beneficiary assigns
the claim to them).
221. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (noting that the payment system is based on
time and resources spent on treating conditions).
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appeals."2 In addition, the Medicare statute does not permit physicians to
consolidate appeals which involve different beneficiaries, but the same
procedure.223 In the cases involving DME, in which the physician is generally
not the supplier and does not receive payment, the physician's role is basically
advisory. Finally, given the realities of compressed medical practice, few
physicians have the time or resources to participate or otherwise assist
beneficiaries in Part B appeals.224
3. Durable Medical Equipment (DME) Suppliers
DME is sold or rented directly to Medicare beneficiaries by so-called
"DME Suppliers." Suppliers have no recognized entitlement interest in
Medicare coverage for their products or in Medicare payment. 225 Further, like
physicians, the supplier's appeal rights are derivative from those of
beneficiaries. 2 6
Yet, the interest of DME suppliers in the Medicare coverage decision-
making and appeals process is great.227 Of note, Medicare expenditures for
DME in 2000 were $18.5 billion22 -1.4% of all health care expenditures. 229
222. Supra note 198 and accompanying text.
223. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(l)(B)(ii) (2000) (stating that a person who provides
services to an individual may only participate in the appeal of a coverage denial if he waives his
right to payment for the service or item involved in the appeal).
224. See Ochs-Ross & Connaughton, supra note 99, at 121 (explaining that physicians are
unlikely to participate in Medicare appeals because the administrative burden of treating
Medicare patients already takes up large portions of their time).
225. See, e.g., TAP Pharm. v. DHHS, 163 F.3d 199, 208 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that a
drug manufacturer does not fall within the zone of interests protected under Medicare Part B
and thus does not have standing for a claim challenging a Medicare decision reducing
reimbursement for the drug); see also Grinstead, supra note 75, at 6 (explaining that after TAP
Pharmaceuticals, a manufacturer "may not be able to formally challenge a decision by the
Medicare program not to pay for that item").
226. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2002) (stating that a person who provides
services to an individual may only participate in the appeal of a coverage denial if he waives his
right to a payment for the service of item involved in the appeal).
227. See Ochs-Ross & Connaughton, supra note 99, at 105 ("DME suppliers, who are paid
on a retrospective basis for specific items of DME, are especially concerned about Medicare
coverage decisions and are active in assisting individual Medicare beneficiaries in appeals of
coverage denials.").
228. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERS., TABLE 13: DURABLE MEDICAL EQUIPMENT
EXPENDITURES AGGREGATE AND PER CAPITA AMOUNTS, PERCENT DISTRIBUTION AND AVERAGE
ANNUAL PERCENT CHANGE BY SOURCE OF FUNDS: SELECTED CALENDAR YEARS 1980-2011, at
http://cms.hhs.gov/statistics/nhe/projections-2001/tl 3.asp (last visited Aug. 20, 2003) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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The products of DME suppliers are often the subject of local and national
coverage decisions as well as coverage denials for the claims of individual
beneficiaries.2 30 Also, because suppliers are still paid on a retrospective basis
for each item of DME used by a beneficiary, a coverage denial of a
beneficiary's claim for DME results in a direct denial of payment for
supplier.23'
4. Health Industry Manufacturers
Health industry manufacturers develop and make the new medical
technology that is the subject of most local and national coverage decisions and
coverage denials precipitating individual appeals. In terms of constitutional
and statutory law, manufacturers have no legal recognition in the Medicare
program. Yet of all constituencies, health industry manufacturers have
exhibited the greatest interest in the Medicare coverage decision-making and
appeals processes.232 They have been the greatest advocates for reforms in the
processes and were the major force in pressing for the BIPA reforms described
above.233
The interest of manufacturers is a business interest. Quite simply, positive
decisions and Medicare coverage at all levels-national, local and individual-
are crucial for manufacturers if their products are to reach their full potential
markets. With Medicaid a close second, Medicare is the largest single payor
for health care services in the United States.234 Of the nation's health dollar,
17% comes from the Medicare program.235 Further, Medicare beneficiaries,
229. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., TABLE I: NATIONAL HEALTH
EXPENDITURES AND SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS, LEVELS AND AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENT
CHANGE: SELECTED CALENDAR YEARS 1980-2011, at http://cms.hhs.gov/statistics/nhe
/projections-200 1/tip (last visited Sept. 1, 2003) (listing the National health expenditures in
2000 as $1,299.5 billion) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
230. See Bagley, supra note 86, at 22 (stating that requests for new coverage decisions
usually come from device manufacturers).
231. See supra note 227 and accompanying text (noting that DME suppliers are concerned
about Medicare coverage decisions because they are paid on a retrospective basis for each item
of DME used by a beneficiary).
232. See Ochs-Ross & Connaughton, supra note 99, at 105 (stating that DME suppliers
and physicians have the greatest interest in Medicare coverage and appeals decisions).
233. See Thompson & Dahl, supra note 67, at 128-29 (discussing manufacturers' concerns
about the coverage process).
234. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., THE NATION'S HEALTH DOLLAR: 2001, at
http://cms.hhs.gov/statistics/nhe/historical/chart.asp (last visited Aug. 20, 2003) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
235. Id.
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who are elderly, severely disabled, or both, are the heavy users of new
procedures, devices and other medical technologies. In addition, Medicare has
the most formal coverage decision-making process. For these reasons, the
Medicare program therefore exercises great influence over other federally
sponsored health insurance programs, such as, Medicaid and health plans for
the military, their dependants and other federal employees, as well as privately-
sponsored health insurance plans. 236  Without Medicare coverage, the
marketing of a health industry manufacturer's product is dead in the water with
the specter of losses and inability to recoup development costs.
Moreover, the interests of the health industry manufacturers are not
insignificant to the U.S. economy. The manufacture and sale of medical
equipment is a major American industry and has continued to grow in the
current economic downturn.237 In 2000, the medical equipment industry
exported more than $15.4 billion in medical equipment.23 A national interest
in maintaining a strong medical device industry may be an appropriate factor to
consider in the Medicare program's coverage decision-making about new
medical technologies.
B. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation of Rights and Probable Value of
Substitute Procedures in the Medicare Coverage Decision-Making and
Appeal Processes
The second prong of the Mathews v. Eldridge analysis addresses the
characteristics of the process at issue.239 In that regard, the first of two issues of
interest is the risk of erroneous deprivation of the protected private interest.
This issue is really concerned about the ability of a process to produce an
accurate determination of the issue at hand and also whether alternative or
additional procedures might do a betterjob. This Part will analyze the coverage
236. See Ochs-Ross & Connaughton, supra note 99, at 105 ("Medicare coverage decisions
influence the coverage provided by private carriers as they often follow Medicare's lead when
deciding whether to provide coverage for new therapies.").
237. See, e.g., Milt Freudenheim, The Healthier Side Of Health Care, N.Y. TMES, Oct. 23,
2002, at C I (explaining that sales and profits for both firms that manufacture and firms that sell
pacemakers increased more than fifteen percent in 2002); David Leonhardt, Health Care As
Main Engine: Is That So Bad?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 200 1, § 3, at I (stating that the healthcare
industry, including the manufacture of medical equipment, has expanded during the recession).
238. DEP'T OF COMMERCE OFFICE OF MICROELECTRONICS, MED. EQUIP. AND
INSTRUMENTATION, INDUS. AND TRADE STATISTICS, at http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/mdequip
/totalexports.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2003) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
239. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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decision-making process and then the Part B beneficiary appeals process in
terms of this standard.
1. The Medicare Coverage Decision-Making Process
The Medicare coverage decision-making process is a legislative policy-
making process. As such, interested and affected individuals do not have a
constitutional right grounded in the procedural Due Process Clause to have an
opportunity to be heard tiihis process.240 That is as it should be, as the process
is the determination of"legislative facts" and the making of policy. Legislative
facts are those facts such as scientific research findings which are necessary to
determine policy. 241 Nevertheless, it is useful to compare the Medicare
coverage decision-making process to the constitutional standard for good
process in Mathews v. Eldridge.
a. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
Regarding the risk of erroneous deprivation, the current Medicare
coverage decision-making process for NCDs does contain mandated procedures
to assure that decision-makers have good information upon which to base their
decisions. 42 Specifically, public notice is given of the initiation of the process
to make an NCD which is designed to give interested constituencies notice and
an opportunity to participate. 243 The process invokes scientific review for
evaluation of the coverage issue through a coverage advisory panel of outside
experts. 244 Independent peer review of medical issues is a time-honored and
240. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Colo., 239 U.S. 441, 445
(1915) (finding that there is no constitutional right to be heard when a rule affects more than a
few people and noting that the rights of a large group are protected by their power to elect the
officials that make the rule),followed in United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224
(1973); see also Ass'n of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1151, 1165-66 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
("When a proceeding is classified as rulemaking, due process ordinarily does not demand
procedures more rigorous than those provided by Congress.").
241. Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative
Process, 55 HARV. L. REv. 364, 402 (1942) (describing legislative facts as those facts which
help an agency determine questions of law or policy).
242. See Bagley, supra note 86, at 19-20 (describing mandated procedures in the coverage
decision-making process).
243. See id. at 25 (explaining that once someone makes a coverage request, CMS makes
the record open to the public).
244. See id. at 31-33 (describing the structure and role of the MCAC, which makes
coverage recommendations to CMS).
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widely accepted approach, used pervasively throughout the federal government,
to address controversial scientific issues.
245
As a further check, disappointed parties can invoke a procedure for
reconsideration.246 Reconsideration is widely used in adjudicative proceedings,
essentially to enable parties to correct errors or otherwise clear up problems in
the decision-making process. It is not always invoked in policy-making
proceedings, and its presence in the Medicare coverage decision-making
process is exemplary.
In recent years, the process by which Medicare carriers and other
Medicare contractors make local coverage decisions has become much more
formal and transparent. Local coverage decision-making is in keeping with a
foundational value of the Medicare program-the recognition that program
administration should be decentralized.247 The theory of this approach,
especially with respect to coverage decision-making, is that decentralized
decision-making allows for needed flexibility in a rapidly developing health
sector.24' Decision-making that is too centralized leads to ossification of
coverage policy and might well inhibit desirable innovation. Nevertheless, the
process for making local coverage decisions also must be fair and transparent.
The April 1999 Notice recognizes these needs and addresses them accordingly.
Whether the resulting decisions in this process are truly "accurate,"
however, is open to question. The major reason for this concern is that often
there is a range of opinions on coverage of a medical technology depending on
views of scientific evidence, costs and other factors. Ultimately, a coverage
decision is a political decision that balances many factors. There really is no
"accurate" decision regarding a disputed coverage issue. Thus, at least insofar
as reviewing courts are concerned, the question becomes one of whether the
decision is reasonable rather than accurate.249
245. See id. at 31 (stating that HCFA examined how other government agencies structured
and used advisory committees in its creation of the MCAC).
246. See id. at 35 (discussing HCFA's policy to reconsider a national coverage decision if
it receives a request and explanation from a disgruntled party).
247. See Ochs-Ross & Connaughton, supra note 99, at 109-10 ("Local carriers make
between eighty percent and ninety percent of all coverage decisions."); see also Judith Lorette et
al., The Perspective ofthe Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, in GUIDE TO MEDICARE
COVERAGE DECISION-MAKING AND APPEALS 149,158 (Eleanor D. Kinney ed., 2002) (stating that
most coverage decisions are made locally).
248. See Lorette et al., supra note 247, at 158 (explaining that flexibility created by local
decision-making may encourage new technologies to spread faster).
249. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 834
(1984) (determining that when Congress has given implicit legislative powers to an agency, the
"court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable
interpretation made by the administrator of an agency"); see also SECTION OF ADMIN. LAW &
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Indeed, the development of criteria for making coverage decisions has
been a very intractable issue for the Medicare program since coverage surfaced
as a serious policy issue in the 1980s. CMS (then HCFA) first tried to state
criteria for coverage decision-making in its 1989 proposed rule. ° In that
proposed rule, HCFA proposed that HCFA and Medicare contractors should
consider the cost-effectiveness of a service in addition to the safety and
effectiveness, experimental, or investigational component, and the
appropriateness when making national coverage decisions.2"' With respect to
cost-effectiveness, HCFA stated: "[C]onsiderations of costs are relevant in
deciding whether to expand or continue coverage of technologies, particularly
in the context of the current explosion of high-cost medical technologies." '252
This criterion generated considerable debate within the health care
industry. Some physicians and health services researchers welcomed the cost-
effectiveness criterion as an effort to address escalating costs while assuring the
availability of quality health care services to Medicare beneficiaries.253 It is
noteworthy that during the 1980s, HCFA had embarked on a formal and
extensive health services research program to evaluate many widely used
medical and surgical procedures in randomized clinical trials.254 The focus of
these trials and other research was analysis of the outcomes of procedures
including cost effectiveness.255
In 2000, CMS published a notice to adopt criteria for Medicare coverage
decision-making.25 6 In this proposed rule, CMS stated that it anticipated CMS
and local contractors would apply two criteria when making NCDs or LCDs,
REGULATORY PRACTICE OF THE AM. BAR ASS'N, A Blackletter Statement of Federal
Administrative Law, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 17, 37-39 (2002) (explaining the Chevron doctrine).
250. Medicare Program; Criteria and Procedures for Making Medical Service Coverage
Decisions that Relate to Healthcare Technology, 54 Fed. Reg. 4302 (Jan. 30, 1989) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 400 & 405).
251. Id. at 4308.
252. Id. at 4308-09.
253. See, e.g., Alexander Leaf, Sounding Board: Cost Effectiveness as a Criterion for
Medicare Coverage, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 898, 898 (1989) (suggesting that the cost
effectiveness criterion could be beneficial in determining whether to fund new procedures).
254. See William L. Roper et al., Effectiveness in Health Care: An Initiative to Evaluate
and Improve Medical Practice, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1197, 1198 (1988) (stating that the
HCFA is funding research to examine the effectiveness of numerous medical procedures).
255. See id. (noting the focus of the trials); see also William L. Roper & Glenn M.
Hackbarth, HCFA 's Agendafor Promoting High-Quality Care, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1988, at
91, 92 ("Most experts agree that Medicare's quality assurance efforts-indeed, all quality
assurance programs-should focus more on the outcome of care and less on the process.").
256. Medicare Program; Criteria for Making Coverage Decisions, 65 Fed. Reg. 31,124
(May 16, 2000) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 403).
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respectively: (1) the item or service must demonstrate medical benefit; and
(2) the item or service must demonstrate added value to the Medicare
population.257 CMS also proposed sequential steps for analyzing these
criteria.258 First, CMS or its contractors would determine whether there is
"sufficient evidence that demonstrates that the item or service is medically
beneficial for a defined population. 259 If they determined that the item or
service would be beneficial, CMS and its contractors would then determine
whether there is a "medically beneficial alternative item or service(s) that is the
same clinical modality and is currently covered by Medicare. 260 If Medicare
did not already cover an alternative, CMS and its contractors determine whether
the item or service is substantially more or substantially less beneficial than the
Medicare-covered alternative.26'
Many Medicare constituencies have expressed concern about these
criteria. The health industry manufacturers have been especially concerned and
vocal about the criteria CMS employs in making coverage policy. 62 The
manufacturers have three fundamental arguments. First, they are required to
get premarket approval of many medical devices and new technologies under
the FDA review process for determining whether their new products are "safe
and effective. 2 63 The manufacturers believe that this FDA approval process
should be sufficient for the purposes of determining Medicare coverage, and
that the Medicare coverage decision-making processes are redundant.2 4
Second, the CMS criteria of cost-effectiveness and added value are not
contemplated by the statutory coverage provisions that items and services be
"reasonable and necessary," but rather the criterion is an unwarranted and
unduly restrictive interpretation of the statutory coverage criteria. 265 Third,





262. Ochs-Ross & Connaughton, supra note 99, at 105.
263. See Thompson & Dahl, supra note 44, at 50-54 (outlining the premarket approval
process for new devices).
264. See Thompson & Dahl, supra note 67, at 142 ("Many manufacturers support the use
of FDA approval as sufficient for coverage and propose that CMS cover FDA-approved
treatment options .. "); see also Christopher D. Zalesky, Considering Changes to CMS's
National Coverage Decision Process: Applying Lessons Learned from FDA as a Regulator of
Access to Healthcare Technology, 57 FOOD DRUG L.J. 73, 75 (2002) (recommending "the
establishment of a CMS/FDA interagency process for reaching national coverage decisions,
whereby CMS would delegate the bulk of the scientific review required for a national coverage
decision to FDA to render a presumptively-final national coverage or non-coverage decision").
265. See Thompson & Dahl, supra note 67, at 141 (discussing the manufacturers' concerns
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health industry manufacturers assert that the evidentiary bar is too high in the
Medicare coverage decision-making process, and that the process often requires
results of randomized clinical trials which are too costly and time-consuming
for most manufacturers in the product development process.266
While a stated goal of CMS in reforming the coverage decision-making
process is the development of criteria for coverage decision-making, CMS has
yet to promulgate its final rule on criteria. The criteria are just as controversial
today as they were when CMS (then HCFA) embarked on this effort in 1989.
This impasse is really due to the lack of consensus among CMS, the Medicare
constituencies, and American society at large about what the criteria should be.
The debate over these criteria goes to the heart of the debate over coverage
of new technology. Should beneficiaries have access to all technology that is
arguably beneficial? Such a criterion would espouse Dr. Avedis Donabedian's
"absolutist" definition of quality of care-that high quality care requires all care
that is beneficial to a patient. 267 On the other hand, should CMS be more
proactive in coverage policy and consider such issues as the fiscal impact of the
coverage of new technology on the costs of the Medicare program? Such
criteria would espouse Dr. Donabedian's "social" definition of quality of
care. 261 Or should the criteria strike a middle ground and cover new technology
that the physician and the patient mutually agree provides benefits at minimal
risk? Such an approach would embrace Dr. Donabedian's preferred definition
269of health care quality-the "individualist" definition. Ideally, the Medicare
program should strive toward criteria that promote this third definition of health
care quality. However, if costs continue to climb, the stewards of the Medicare
program may have to adopt coverage criteria that espouse a more "social"
definition of health care quality and consider the societal impact of the high
cost of a new technology. According to the Medicare Trustees, by 2035,
Medicare expenditures will comprise 5.3% of GDP, and by 2077, Medicare
that the cost-effectiveness and added value criterion impose limitations on the practice of
medicine).
266. See id. at 142-43 (listing the hierarchy of clinical evidence which CMS uses to
determine whether the evidence is sufficient).
267. See AVEDIS DONABEDIAN, THE DEFINITION OF QUALITY AND APPROACHES TO ITS
ASSESSMENT 13 (1980) (defining the "absolutist" definition of quality of care); see also Avedis
Donabedian, Quality, Cost, and Clinical Decisions, 468 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI.
196, 199-204 (1983) (same).
268. See Donabedian, Quality, Cost and Clinical Decisions, supra note 267, at 202
(defining the "social definition of quality" as balancing "the expected net benefits of care against
the social as well as the individual costs of care").
269. See DONABEDIAN, THE DEFINITION OF QUALITY, supra note 267, at 13-14 (explaining
the "individualist" definition of quality of care).
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expenditures will comprise 9.3% of GDP, compared to only 2.6% in 2002.270
A social definition of coverage in the Medicare program ultimately may be
necessary to preserve the program.
b. The Probable Value of Additional or Substitute Procedures
The second prong of the Mathews v. Eldridge analysis also calls for the
determination of the probable value of additional or substitute procedures in
making accurate decisions.271 The analysis of this criterion exposes an
important truth in the Medicare coverage decision-making process.
Specifically, the truth is that the health industry manufacturers' press for more
formal and public decision-making procedures and the resistance to these
measures by HCFA and CMS has actually been a battle for control of the
Medicare coverage decision-making process.
Initially, the manufacturers pressed to bring the process out into the open
by making the deliberations of the HCFA physicians committee public and
accessible. 272 In following years, HCFA--only after much pressure-passed
reforms designed to make the process more regular, transparent and
participatory.273 Still not satisfied, in 1999, representatives of the health
industry manufacturers initiated a rulemaking procedure pursuant to § 553(e) of
the Administrative Procedure Act.274 In the petition for rulemaking, attorneys
for the Indiana Medical Device Manufacturers Council petitioned HCFA for a
rule to establish a transparent coverage decision-making process.275  The
manufacturers also attracted the interest of the Republican Chair of the Health
270. 2003 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL HOSPITAL
INSURANCE AND FEDERAL SUPPLEMENTARY MEDICAL INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS, § 1.B, at
http://cms.hhs.gov/pubIications/trusteesreport/2003/secib.asp (last visited Sept. 8, 2003) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
271. See supra notes 192, 194 and accompanying text (identifying and discussing the
second prong of Mathews v. Eldridge).
272. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text (noting that the health equipment
manufacturing industry encouraged the Subcommittee on Health to hold hearings on the
coverage decision-making process).
273. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (stating that Congress responded to pressure
from the medical device manufacturers and enacted legislation making HCFA more accountable
to parties interested in its decisions).
274. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2000) ("Each agency shall give an interested person the right
to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.").
275. Citizens Petition from Bradley Merrill Thompson, Baker & Daniels, to Nancy-Ann




Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee in the Medicare
coverage decision-making and appeals process, which eventually resulted in the
enactment of § 551 and § 552 of BIPA, described above.276
CMS's reluctance to implement BIPA reforms, especially those permitting
affected beneficiaries from initiating reviews of national and local coverage
decisions is probably due in part to concern about losing control of the
coverage decision-making processes.277 Like none other, this reform would
wrest much control of the coverage decision-making agenda from CMS. This
process not only gives beneficiaries, and the manufacturers who support them
financially, control over initiation of the proceeding, but also locates decision-
making in the context of a beneficiary's desperate struggle for healing and not
in a more dispassionate process where contrary scientific evidence would
inevitably be more persuasive. It is not surprising (although not politically
astute) that CMS specifically chose not to pursue such individual requests for
278coverage decisions.
CMS only promulgated a proposed rule after beneficiaries and several
beneficiary advocacy groups filed suit to prevent requests for individual
coverage decisions regarding new medical procedures from being shelved in
CMS. 279 This incident begs the question of whether beneficiary-initiated
coverage decision-making proceedings do add probable value to the process of
Medicare coverage decisions. The answer to this issue is political and depends
on how one believes power over the process should be allocated among CMS
and its constituencies.
2. The Medicare Beneficiary Appeals Process
The Medicare beneficiary appeals process is protected as an adjudicative
process under the constitutional guarantee of procedural due process in the
Fifth Amendment. As such, beneficiaries who are adversely affected by
government action in a public entitlement program are entitled to notice and an
276. See supra Part 1l.B.2 (outlining BIPA's reforms of coverage decision-making
processes).
277. See supra note 117 and accompanying text (describing CMS's refusal to implement
the provisions allowing beneficiaries to initiate processes for coverage decisions).
278. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (noting a 2001 CMS ruling announcing
that CMS would delay implementation of the reforms and established procedures for handling
beneficiary challenges to coverage decisions).
279. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (finding that the threat of a class action by
advocacy groups representing the disabled finally led CMS to publish the proposed rule in
August 2002).
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opportunity to be heard. As an adjudicative process, it concerns so-called
"adjudicative facts," involving circumstances and events at issue in the
dispute.280 The Mathews v. Eldridge due process analysis pertains to this type
of proceeding.
a. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
Since 1986, with the addition of administrative review before an ALJ and
judicial review,281 the beneficiary Part B appeals process has contained all the
procedures of other government benefit programs. Specifically, like the Social
Security income support programs,282 and more recently veterans' benefit
programs, 8 3 the Medicare Part B appeals process offers both administrative and
judicial review.284 In addition, beneficiaries have always had a right to a "fair
hearing" before the Medicare carrier.285 In Schweiker v. McClure,286 the
Supreme Court ruled that this "fair hearings" process alone-even without
further administrative and judicial review-passed constitutional muster under
the Mathews v. Eldridge test.
2 87
Yet the beneficiary appeals process under Part B has been exceptionally
controversial since the inception of the Medicare program. One reason for the
controversy has been the high rate of decisions in favor of beneficiaries by
ALJs. Specifically, in the last five years, claimants prevailed in fifty-three
percent of appeals.2 8
There are several reasons for this controversy. The primary reason is that
the appeals process is handling two fundamentally different types of disputants
with fundamentally different concerns at issue: (1) individual beneficiaries
280. See Davis, supra note 241, at 402 (defining administrative facts as information
concerning the actions of the parties, the circumstances, and the background conditions).
281. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (noting that Congress established
administrative and judicial review for Part B claims).
282. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (2000).
283. 38 U.S.C. § 7101 (2000).
284. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (finding that the Social Security
Amendments of 1965 provided administrative and judicial review of eligibility determinations
for beneficiaries under Parts A and B).
285. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (citing the Social Security Amendments of
1965 as requiring carriers to provide fair hearing procedures for beneficiaries).
286. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1981).
287. See id. at 200 (finding that additional procedures were not needed to reduce the risk of
erroneous deprivation of benefits).
288. Robert Pear, Bush Pushes Plan to Curb Medicare Appeals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16,
2003, at Al.
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who are challenging the denial of an item or service that they need; and
(2) health equipment manufacturers and DME suppliers that have a financial
interest in Medicare coverage as the key to the market for their products. The
interests of these two categories of disputants are described above.289 Quite
simply, the current "one-size-fits-all" appeals process may not be conducive to
the accurate or the satisfactory disposition of the concerns of these types of
disputants.
The current process of a fair hearing before the carrier with administrative
review before an AU with strong authority to develop the record is probably
ideal for assuring that accurate determinations are made in the appeal of
coverage denials of individual beneficiaries. The procedures are informal and
not adversarial-hallmarks of sound process designed to adjudicate relatively
small claims of unsophisticated individuals.
290
The current process probably does not assure accurate determinations with
respect to claims of interest by health equipment manufacturers, DME
suppliers, or providers. These constituencies, although representing individual
beneficiaries, are generally interested in challenging unfavorable local or
national coverage decisions to obtain the requisite Medicare coverage needed to
market their products. In this instance, the nature of the adjudicative decision
is fundamentally different than that in the case of an independent beneficiary.
The issue is really one of policy, similar to the coverage decision-making
process involving "legislative facts. 29' It is not really a decision about whether
the coverage denial, given the particular circumstances of the individual
beneficiary in the case, was based on existing law and policy. In this case, as
with the coverage decisions made in the Medicare coverage decision-making
process described above, there is really no "accurate" decision but rather a
"political" decision that is reasonable.
b. The Probable Value ofAdditional or Substitute Procedures
In conceiving reforms and thereby evaluating the probable value of
additional or substitute procedures, it is wise to appreciate that different
procedural elements might be appropriate for each of the two types of
289. See supra Parts III.A. 1, III.A.3-4 (discussing the interests of beneficiaries, DME
suppliers, and health industry manufacturers).
290. See Henry Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267,1278 (1975)
("As we go down the [list of types of government actions that call for a hearing] from the more
severe actions to the less, the needle would point to fewer and fewer requirements on the list of
required safeguards.").
291. See supra note 241 and accompanying text (defining legislative facts).
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disputants. Often the interests of the two types of disputants are not always
compatible. For example, while health industry manufacturers assert that
the carrier "fair hearings" are unnecessary and burdensome,29' beneficiary
advocates have argued that the fair hearings are good for beneficiaries
because they facilitate quick resolution of appeals without the expense of
an ALJ hearing.293
Other areas where procedural elements to the appeals process might be
reconceived is with respect to the involvement of CMS in the hearing. For
beneficiary appeals that are supported by manufacturers, suppliers, or
providers, it is advisable to permit CMS to participate in the hearing, to
elucidate the paramount policy issues that are really at stake in hearings
with this class of disputants. The question of independent medical review
is interesting. BIPA mandated the designation of eleven independent
expert review organizations, the QICs to perform reconsideration of carrier
decisions on issues of medical necessity. 294 Under current process theory,
independent medical review should contribute to greater accuracy in
adjudicating coverage denials in beneficiary appeals. This independent
review is consistent with recent reform proposals for the protection of
patients in managed care plans. 295 Furthermore, social science research has
demonstrated that litigants are more comfortable with the decisions in
adjudications proceedings when physicians who are independent of each
296party make decisions on medical issues. CMS is just starting to
implement independent review process, 297 and has asked Congress to
reduce the number of required QICs to not less than four.
298
292. Medicare Coverage Decisions, supra note 80 (Testimony of Walter M. Rosenbrough,
Jr., Member, Board of Directors, Health Industry Manufacturers Association).
293. Medicare Coverage Decisions, supra note 80 (Testimony of Vicki Gottlich, National
Senior Citizens Law Center).
294. See supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text (describing the role of qualified
independent contractors in reviewing Medicare coverage determinations).
295. See KINNEY, supra note 54, at 12-13 (noting that most work by consumer advocates
has focused on, among other things, external medical review).
296. See Norman G. Poythress et al., Procedural Justice Judgments of Alternative
Proceduresfor Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims, 23 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1639,
1655 (1993) (indicating that court-appointed expert model is perceived to be fairer than
adversarial model).
297. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (noting that in November 2002 CMS
promulgated a proposed rule to implement some of the BIPA reforms).
298. Hearings of the Subcomm. on Health of the House Ways & Means Comm. on
Medicare, Regulatory, and Contracting Reform, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Thomas A.
Scully, Administrator, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services) (suggesting that by reducing
the number of quality improvement contractors from twelve to four, CMS could perform the
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In considering all reform proposals, it is important to preserve access to
the appeals process for individual Medicare beneficiaries who are not
supported by health equipment manufacturers, suppliers or providers in their
appeals. Thus, appeal procedures need to be informal, straightforward,
inexpensive, and accessible. Evidentiary burdens should not be great. Also,
process elements such as mediation-which has been used effectively to
resolve coverage disputes in managed care plans299 -should be considered
for resolving these types of beneficiary appeals.
In March 2003 in a front-page article, the New York Times criticized
CMS proposals as compromising fairness in the beneficiary appeals
process.3° In reality, however, this article critiques those procedures that
CMS contemplated as reforming undesirable aspects of the appeals process
with respect to appeals in which beneficiaries are supported by
manufacturers, providers, or suppliers. To avoid such criticism and address
the legitimate concerns regarding appeals of independent beneficiaries,
different procedures for each type of disputant might be appropriate.
In sum, the CMS proposals for reforms of the appeals process as well
as BIPA's mandate to impose independent medical review of national and
local coverage decisions and beneficiary appeals indicate a battle for
control of the beneficiaries' appeals process and the outcomes of this
process. CMS wants to bring the process into its power and also to lower
the visibility of the disposition of appeals through more private dispute
resolution methods such as mediation. Beneficiaries and particularly the
health industry manufacturers and suppliers prefer the current process, with
more independence of critical decision-makers such as ALJs. This battle
for control ultimately indicates a fundamental debate about the coverage
and scope of Medicare benefits. Yet this debate ultimately invokes policy
issues. Its resolution essentially involves political decisions about how
much the federal government should spend on the Medicare program in
view of competing priorities for public funding.
same functions more economically and efficiently).
299. See Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Mediating Disputes in Managed Care: Resolving
Conflicts over Covered Services, 5 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 479, 500 (2002) (concluding
that mediation provides a "simple and appealing process for settling conflicts in managed care
situations that are based on disagreements about benefits coverage").
300. See Pear, supra note 288 (characterizing the proposed reforms as "legislation and
rules that would limit the judges' independence and could replace them in many cases").
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C. The Government's Interest
The final prong of the Mathews v. Eldridge analysis is the
government's interest, including its fiscal interests. The opinion explains
that, while "financial cost alone is not a controlling weight in determining
whether due process requires a particular procedural safeguard," the
government's interest does permit a determination that "at some point the
benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual affected by the
administrative action and to society in terms of increased assurance that the
action is just, may be outweighed by the cost."'3 ' In one sense the interest
of CMS is obvious and has been a major factor in driving the reality of the
Medicare coverage decision-making and appeals processes. In another
sense, the interest of the federal government is more complex and may be
at odds with the first interest.
The first interest, of course, is the need to control escalating Medicare
expenditures. Medicare expenditures have been rising, and continue to
rise, at an alarming rate. Further, as discussed above, the most recent
Medicare Trustees report shows dramatic increases in the growth of
Medicare expenditures in the twenty-first century.30 2 Obviously, with such
trends the stewards of the Medicare program have been ever vigilant in
efforts to control Medicare program expenditures and their growth.
Appreciating that new medical technology is an important contribution to
growing Medicare expenditures, stewards of the Medicare program have
sought to ensure appropriate access and use of new medical technology in
the Medicare program through tight management of the Medicare coverage
decision-making and appeals processes.
However, a more permissive coverage decision-making and appeals
process that calibrates the interpretation of Medicare coverage policy
generally in favor of expansion of Medicare coverage may be desirable
public policy. Several reasons support the reconsideration of the interests
of the federal government in this regard. First, health industry
manufacturing is an important industry for the United States, commanding
its own office in the Department of Commerce to promote the export of
health equipment manufactured in the United States.30 3 This industry, with
301. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976).
302. See supra note 270 and accompanying text (predicting that Medicare expenditures
will comprise 5.3% of GDP by 2035, 9.3% by 2077).
303. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text (citing the Department of Commerce
Office of Microelectronics, Medical Equipment and Instrumentation's statistics of significant
medical equipment exports and noting the industry's growth during an economic downturn).
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its skilled and well-paid workforce, is important for the economic security
of the United States.
It may well be that it is good public policy for Medicare coverage
decision-making to be more receptive to the research and development
agenda of health industry manufacturers. For example, for especially
promising technologies it may be desirable to grant provisional coverage during
a randomized clinical trial of the technology to mitigate some of the research
and development costs incurred in developing the requisite data for a
comparative efficacy with existing technologies and cost effectiveness needed
for making a final coverage decision. It is noteworthy that the Medicare
program has already taken this step with respect to coverage of clinical trials for
certain experimental drugs.' 4 Such coverage could do much to establish the
scientific basis of the most promising new technologies and establish their
comparative clinical efficacy and cost-effectiveness. However, such a step
would be a sharp departure from the current CMS policy of not financing
research and development of health industry manufacturers.
IV. Conclusion
The projections of national health expenditures and the proportion of the
elderly in the national population portend continued controversy for the
Medicare coverage decision-making and appeals processes. These trends will
continue to put great pressure on these processes. Medicare coverage decision-
making and appeals processes are the venues in which the battle over program
costs, and ultimately the future design and content of the Medicare program,
will play out.
The operation of Medicare coverage decision-making and appeals
processes will greatly influence the future of the Medicare program.
Specifically, if the coverage decision-making process-at both the national and
local level--continues to work in a scientifically sound fashion and with an
expanded appreciation and accommodation of the situation of health industry
manufacturers in bringing beneficial new products to market, the Medicare
program will retain its leadership in the complex but crucial role of sorting out
what expensive new medical technology is really beneficial. If the Medicare
program becomes too restrictive in coverage decision-making and in
adjudicating appeals, then the program may block access to beneficial
304. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., COVERAGE ISSUES MANUAL, CIJACAL
TRIALS, at http://www.cms.gov/manuals/06cim/ci30.asp (last visited Sept. 9, 2003) (detailing
the Medicare coverage of routine costs of qualifying clinical trials).
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technologies and the interest of key constituencies for the Medicare program as
a universal social insurance program--the medical profession and more
affluent Medicare beneficiaries-will wane as they seek access to noncovered
technologies outside the context of the Medicare program. Consequently, their
important advocacy for Medicare coverage of new technologies will weaken.
Also, the program might well move towards becoming a needs-based program
for the poor and lower-middle class, with the more affluent beneficiaries getting
access to new technologies through private insurance coverage or their own
resources.
Nevertheless, the implementation and operation of the Medicare coverage
decision-making and appeals processes should not contribute inadvertently to a
more limited Medicare program. Rather, the evolution of the future Medicare
program to the extent played out in coverage decision-making and appeals
processes should be made democratically in existing and hopefully transparent
political processes.
NOTES

